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

Nurettin Topçu

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BOOKS

BERGSON

Nurettin Topçu

In our 1978 endeavour, we had intended to publish the Hoca's writings in a new arrangement; consequently, whilst *The Turkey of Tomorrow* was reorganised in a manner somewhat different from its previous two editions, *The Principles of Our Nationalism* emerged as a new book.

We can summarise the principles of the publication we are now endeavouring to produce as follows:

1. Excluding Nurettin Bey's textbooks on Philosophy, Logic, Psychology, Sociology and Ethics, as well as his doctoral thesis *The Ethics of Rebellion* and his associate professorship thesis *Bergson*,
all his other works consist of previously published articles compiled into books centred on specific topics and concepts that the Professor had previously addressed and reinterpreted. Although this is the case, we deemed it more appropriate to retain the titles of the books compiled during the Professor's lifetime and with his consent, essentially as they were originally published ( ). Taking into account the similarities, and indeed the inseparability, of their contents, *Islam and Man* and *M
evifina and Sufism, and *The Cause of the

and *State and Democracy*. The titles of both books contained within will appear on the covers of these volumes.

2. Articles that had been published as such but had not been included in any of the books were identified, and the vast majority of them have been placed in the relevant sections of the books to which they are suitable in terms of content. With the exception of technical adjustments, no alterations have been made to these articles, no alterations have been made apart from technical adjustments. During his lifetime, Nurettin Bey made only limited simplifications and very few amendments and corrections to the articles that were published as books. It can be said that these amendments and simplifications, based on the author's proofread copies—some of which are preserved in the Dergah Yayınları archive—do not constitute a change in ideas, nor do they serve to soften or reinforcement.

Nevertheless, it would be beneficial for those undertaking academic research to compare these with their original published forms.

3. One of the most significant tasks undertaken during this publication was to provide the bibliographic details at the end of each article. This chronology, which is of exceptional importance in terms of Nurettin Topçu's intellectual struggle, politics, distinctiveness and stance, will also reveal the story of a 'stance' rarely seen in the history of the Republic. To give an example, it can be said that Topçu's articles analysing and critiquing the concept of democracy—of which there are few contemporaneous examples in Turkey—were written in the wake of the 1960 coup (these articles are included in the book *State and Democracy*). In these bibliographical entries, the original place of publication of the text is specified, followed by the book(s) in which it appeared and their editions; where the version in the books consists of a compilation of multiple texts,
, this is also indicated.

Upon request, some of Topçu's articles were also published in other journals by way of reprint. The mention of more than one journal or newspaper title in the bibliographic entries indicates these repeated publications.

As the bibliographic entries use abbreviations consisting of the first letters of the book titles, we wish to list these in alphabetical order: AN: Ahlak nizamı,

BF: The Great

Conquest, 6

BERGSON

DD: State and Democracy,

GIZAG: The Western Scientific Mindset and Ethical Perspective, ID: The Cause of Trade,

//: Islam and humanity,

KKYN: A New Order Against Communism,

KM: Culture and Civilisation,

MA: Mehmet Akif,

ME: The Principles of Our Nationalism,

MT: Mevlana and Sufism,

Ş: Martyr,

TMD: Turkey's Educational Cause, VO:

To Exist,

YT: Turkey of Tomorrow.

Where a text appears in multiple editions of a book is also indicated. (For example, if 'TM Dil, 2'

appears at the end of an article, this indicates that it appears in the 1st and 2nd editions of Turkey's Educational Cause; if 'TMD/2' appears, it indicates that it appears only in the 2nd edition). If there is no note regarding book abbreviations at the end of an article, this indicates that the article appeared in the respective books for the first time.

4. Unfortunately, the original publication sources of only a very small proportion of the articles included in these books could not be identified. With the
we hope to rectify this shortcoming in future editions

. The journals we have searched in full or in part for bibliographic details are as follows: Hareket, Büyük Doğu, Türk Yurdu, Düşünen Adam, Islam,

Sebilürreşad, Türk Düşüncesi, Şule, Tohum, Islam Medeniyeti, Komünizme Karşı Mücadele, Yeni İstiklal, Türk Ruhu, Serdengeçti, Asrın Dini Müslümanlık, Bizim Türkiye.

5. Nurettin Bey's newspaper columns, which did not last very long but held particular significance as they intensified following the military interventions of 1960 and 1971 ,
. Havadis (under the pseudonym Osman Asyalı), Son Havadis,
Yeni Istanbul, Hürsöz (Erzurum) and Akşam are significant in this regard; however, a systematic review of these—7

and the collected articles could not be categorised. For this reason, it was not deemed appropriate to scatter the available newspaper articles throughout the books; instead, it is envisaged that future studies will see these newspaper articles published as separate volumes. Following these scans, Nurettin Bey's almost complete chronological bibliography has also emerged

.

6. The book *Taşra*, which brings together Topçu's short stories, and the four textbooks, which have undergone partial revisions in accordance with the curriculum, will also be published within the collected works.

As we present the collected works of Nurettin Topçu in their new form to our readers and to Turkish intellectual and cultural life, we remember our Professor with fondness.

May he rest in peace.

Contents Preface /

1 I

CHAPTER ONE: BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY I/IS

I. The Context of Thought / 17

II. His Works / 29

III. His Understanding of Philosophy and the Quest for

Truth / 43 CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS INTUITION? /

59

I. The Various Meanings of Intuition / 61

II. Bergson's Intuitionism/5

III. Criticisms of Bergson's Intuitionism/96

PART THREE: THE INTUITION OF REALITIES/109

I. Intuition in Art/111

II. The Ethics of

Intuition/120 III.

Intuition and

Religion/124 .

References/135

FOREWORD

Henri Bergson, born in Paris in 1859, was the son of a Jewish family who had come from England and settled in France. After completing his secondary education at the Lycée Condorcet, he won the mathematics prize in a rhetoric competition held in 1877.

However, he subsequently found mathematics tedious and turned to philosophy. Having passed the entrance examination for the École Normale Supérieure (Higher Teachers' College) in Paris, he continued his studies in philosophy. He had as his tutors such figures as Léon Ollé-Laprune, a great master of Catholic philosophy, and Émile Boutroux, a keen analytical mind,

were among his teachers. With his excellent command of English, he carefully read the works of Stuart and Herbert Spencer. He adopted Spencer's theory of evolution.

Spencer's theory of evolution would form the starting point for the philosophy of creative evolution that he would go on to develop. His thorough mastery of English philosophy broadened his analytical and critical faculties. He was strongly influenced by Platonic philosophy. At the same time, he engaged with the natural sciences, conducting in-depth research in the field of biology.

He taught philosophy successively at the Collège Rollen in Angers and at the Lycée Henri IV in Paris. He later lectured at the École Normale Supérieure. On 14 , he was elected a member of the French Academy

. Finally, he became a professor at the Collège de France. After the First World War, he served as a member of the League of Nations, established in Geneva, ll

FOREWORD

scientific cooperation commission of the League of Nations, established in Geneva. In 1924, due to his deteriorating health caused by advancing rheumatism
, he withdrew to his villa near Paris
. He lived in seclusion for eight years, cutting himself off from society. He did not leave his home.

In 1932, he left his home for the first time to visit some friends at the Collège de France. In the same year, he published the book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, which he had prepared whilst in seclusion. In this book, he accepted mysticism as the source of humanity's religion and morality, which he described as 'manifest'. Whilst he was in seclusion, those who expected him—as every philosopher does—to complete his system with a philosophy of ethics had grown impatient and had put forward
. Whilst some assumed that Bergson's ethics would be based on a positivist theory of evolution in the style of Spencer, others claimed, quite the opposite, that Bergson would establish a mystical ethics. Bergson ultimately proved the latter group right with his final work, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, and upon emerging from his retreat
he travelled to Grenoble to congratulate Jacques Chevalier, a professor of philosophy at the city's university, for having understood him most accurately, and personally

Bergson Medal, which had just been issued. Two years later, he compiled his earlier articles into a single volume and published it under the title *La Pensée et le Mouvant*
. In the final month of 1940, six months after France's defeat in the Second World War, he died in Paris at the age of eighty-one.

Bergson, who was as much an artist as he was a philosopher, wrote in a style that is both subtle and fluid, whilst being richly adorned with witticisms. It is surely impossible for any translation to preserve the natural ease of his expression. *Creative Evolution*,

, *Creative Evolution*, can be regarded as a masterpiece of both art and literature, with its vivid descriptions and rich metaphors.
In *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*—written

towards the end of his life—1 2 BERGSON

, his views on social life take up far more space than the psychological analyses that characterised his earlier works.

At the same time, whilst analysing mysticism in the third and fourth chapters of this work and evaluating this doctrine, we become aware of the awe-inspiring
. Philosophy seems to be kneeling at the threshold of the mystical experience
. With this final characteristic, the work has struck a deep chord in the faith-seeking spirit of the age. Essentially, Bergson's philosophy restored hope and faith in the attainment of absolute truth to nineteenth-century humanity—which had lost them under the destructive influence of positivism and various relativist philosophical systems—by introducing the method of intuition towards the end of that century. For this reason, he was met with interest and admiration in every country. His influence spread throughout the world in a short space of time. There is perhaps no other philosopher who, whilst still alive, received such acclaim and attention, or was so thoroughly understood. In the
, in the face of the successive waves of relativist philosophies, Bergsonism became, as it were, the guardian of the front of hope in the human conscience. Towards the end of his life, as he put forward his thesis defending mysticism with magnificent analyses, we sense in him the strides of a devout soul seeking to reunite with its God. In our age, which is wretched in every respect, the philosophy of existentialism—which may be an expression of despair in the quest for the absolute—cannot yet be said to have fully filled the sphere of influence of Bergsonism. Despite some of its superficial aspects

, Bergsonism has opened doors of hope and inspiration capable of captivating humanity in every century.

1 3

Bergson’s works, their publication dates and the abbreviations used in the text: *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1889) *Don. im.*

Matière et mémoire (1897) Mat.

mem.

Le rire (1900) Rir.

Évolution créatrice (1907) Ev. cr.

Spiritual Energy (1919) En. sp.

Duration and Simultaneity

(1922) Dur. sim.

The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932) Mor. rel. Thought

and the Moving (1934)

Thought
and the
Moving
(1934)

14

1. CHAPTER

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON

I. THE CONTEXT OF HIS THOUGHT

Bergson is one of those philosophers whose works are the easiest to read, yet the most difficult to grasp in their entirety. This ease of reading stems from Bergson's mastery of style. His works, and above all his book *Creative Evolution* (*Évolution créatrice*), seem to have been penned by a master artist. Carefully

words, a brilliant style that seems to gain a vital momentum through vivid metaphors, has, one might say, secured the work an important place even in the history of literature. All these stylistic virtues are what cause Bergson's works to be read with curiosity, admiration and a deep fascination. However, the method Bergson employs in setting out his system hinders a simple and straightforward understanding of it. The primary reason for this difficulty is that Bergson is not merely a logician. He claims, first and foremost, to establish a metaphysics grounded in psychological foundations. The mental phenomena that form the basis of this system, however, are not static elements that have been formed and completed in a single
formed and completed in a single instance. Rather, they are dynamic elements that are perhaps in a state of becoming at every moment, gaining new life at every moment within the flow of time. For this reason, it is impossible to grasp the system they constitute through a simple, spatial understanding confined to a static framework.
They are being experienced at every moment and are constantly assuming new forms. Our consciousness cannot grasp these from the outside.

For our consciousness perceives space. It cannot perceive the reality of

time as it is—1 7

we must adapt ourselves to it and, in this way, live the life of time
experience the life of time alongside it at every moment. The philosopher, bound to the expression of this vital reality—which consists entirely of continuous becoming—sought to imbue expression itself with the continuity and creativity inherent in thought.

In his works, one cannot come across a sentence that presents an idea or a thesis as complete in itself! (

and a meaning that is exhausted within itself. Just as spiritual states arise within us through the creativity of the flow of time, so too do his sentences seem to give rise to one another. The expression of his purpose never

. Sentences, like life itself, constantly pursue a process of creation. In his work, it is as though every idea does not find its conclusion in words; perhaps it begins where a word ends and follows a dynamic momentum in the form of a vital impulse. This is why Bergson's works are so compelling. The fact that all the philosophical currents of our age have, to a greater or lesser extent, been influenced by him can also be explained by this compelling force.

A second reason for the difficulty in understanding Bergson's works is that the philosopher has never fully explained or concluded any of the many and varied philosophical theses he addresses within a single work; rather, he has repeatedly revisited the same problem or thesis from various
perspectives in many of his works. The question of intuition, which is the subject of this study, has also been revisited repeatedly in almost all of Bergson's works

and touched upon on numerous occasions for various reasons

. In order to properly understand the method of intuition, which forms the foundation of Bergson's philosophy, we felt it necessary to first

philosopher's system as a whole. Furthermore, to facilitate an understanding of the work, we shall first say a few words about the currents prevailing in the world of philosophy at the time Bergson began to establish his system.

I. When Bergson began his philosophical career, we see that Kantian relativism had taken deep root in Europe. In the 18th

BERGSON

, Kant had argued that the traditional philosophy's zeal for the pursuit of truth was futile; he had maintained that it was necessary to first examine the capacities of consciousness to determine whether it was
and, in doing so, had concluded that the true structure of things—which he termed 'noumena'—could never be known by our consciousness, since consciousness was not an instrument designed for that purpose. Thus, Kant's 'critique' had led to a subjective relativism arising from the incapacity of our mind to perceive what lies beyond it.

According to him, we must content ourselves with recognising only phenomena. Since the noumena, which constitute the true structure of things, can never , so it is impossible for us to engage in metaphysics. For the human mind, any metaphysical inquiry was doomed to remain fruitless. Kant had thus plunged philosophy into a dark night. His subject was limited to the critique of the mind itself. Providing knowledge of the phenomenon (phänomenon) was the task of the sciences. We were condemned to remain confined within the limits of this relative knowledge, which we could only obtain from things in a manner consistent with the structure of our mind. The currents of relativism, which acknowledged the mind's absolute incapacity to recognise truth and were based on this principle, appeared one after another in various forms within the philosophical world during the 19th century. Bergson initially took a stand against these currents and investigated the causes of the error that led Kant—the founder of relativism—to the idea that the noumenon is unknowable. The main causes of this error were as follows: a) According to Kant, the matter and form of knowledge were of different kinds. Kant first a faculty for establishing relations, whilst accepting that the objects between which these relations are established originate from a source outside the mind. For the forms of knowledge are the philosophy set out by Aristotle in ancient Greece.

2. Ev. cr. p. 286.

Although it resided in the intellect, its substance came to us from things. However, it did not explain how the mind's patterns for establishing relationships came into being.

b) Kant accepted the existence of unchanging forms and categories within the mind, and held that the material of knowledge—sensations—originates from the external world and, by entering into these forms and categories, provides knowledge of the external world. Thus, the material of knowledge was subject to forms that are immutable within us. The idea that our mind is in a state of constant becoming was entirely alien to Kant. He did not recognise the absolute existence of time (3). He did not properly distinguish time from space. The categories were the product of a delusion that regarded time as belonging to the same category as space.
The reason for the error running from Zeno of Elea to Kant lies in the philosophers' failure to recognise true change and the continuity of time. Their conceptions of time were derived from notions pertaining to space<4>.

c) Nor did Kant believe that the mind could transcend the limits of reason. Indeed, he appreciated the value of a system of intuition in attaining truth. He said: ‘If a metaphysics is possible, it will be possible not through dialectical endeavour, but through a vision (vision) … However, a superior intuition (which Kant calls ‘intellectual intuition’), a perception derived from metaphysical reality, would grant the possibility of establishing a metaphysical science”<s>. Yet Kant did not accept that such an intuition was possible. The reason that led him to accept this impossibility was that he conceived of such intuition ‘as a faculty of cognition absolutely distinct from the senses and consciousness’<6>. According to Kant, the reason for the impossibility of metaphysics

was that neither the senses nor consciousness could attain true reality. Truth lies beyond the reality accessible through the senses and consciousness. 3rd ed., p. 224.

4. Pen. mou., pp. 177–8.

5. Pen. mou., p. 175.

6. Pen. mou., p. 176.

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beyond it was a reality belonging to the noumenon. He had assumed that there was no intuition capable of conveying the perception of the noumenon (71). Thus, Kant’s philosophy, the source of relativism, was based on such flawed foundations.

2. When Bergson began his philosophical work, one of the prevailing currents in the world of ideas was positivism, founded by Auguste Comte. The efforts of idealists such as Fichte and Schelling, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to rescue philosophy from the darkness into which Kant had led it and to find a means of revealing the noumenon, had failed to prevent the rapid and widespread proliferation of relativism in various forms throughout that century.

In the first half of the century, in France, Auguste Comte, taking Kant's idea regarding the by asserting that nothing called the noumenon existed, that such a conception was absurd, and that metaphysics was nothing but a dream. All things consisted solely of phenomena, which are recognised through the aid of our senses.
The sciences would be able to provide perfect knowledge of phenomena in every field.

However, the knowledge of the subject—that is, consciousness—remained, as at first glance it did not appear to be an event external to us. For the characteristics of positive knowledge were that it was obtained through experience within the conditions of determinism.

To overcome this difficulty, Comte was compelled to completely reject psychology, which provides knowledge of the subject—that is,

thinking subject.
He claimed that our knowledge of the subject would henceforth be provided by biology—the science of objects—and sociology, which was still in its infancy, acting in concert.
The distinction between the 'object' (objet)—which arises within the framework of determinism and is subject to experimentation—and the 'subject' (sujet), which does not appear to possess these characteristics, is thus eliminated, and the subject is reduced to the object, that is, the self is reduced to the object. Bi-
7. Pen. mou., pp. 175–6.

All our knowledge of the object consisted of recognising its characteristics through the senses. For us, all existence consisted of these characteristics. The object, which is the sole reality—that is, the object possessing external characteristics

, imposes itself upon the perceiving consciousness exactly as it is.

Thus, the subordination of our mind to things gave rise to an objective relativism. Recognising the external characteristics of things: this was to be the sum total of our knowledge. There could be nothing beyond this knowledge provided by the sciences, and

metaphysics was not merely impossible, but also an absurd and utterly meaningless pursuit. By closing the door of hope that Kant had left open, Comte

a direction entirely new and distinct from the previous one. Yet human consciousness could not cease to seek the absolute truth beyond experience.

Bergson put forward the idea that the true nature of things could be recognised

that their true nature could be recognised. According to Kant, things conformed to the order of our mind. According to Comte, the mind was
was compelled to conform to the order of things.

Bergson claimed that it was possible to reach the truth through a different mode of cognition, one that liberates the mind from the cycle of relativism created by both approaches. This would involve the mind merging with things at the very outset of movements, with the aim of reaching a shared resolution; and such
approach would naturally lead to its conclusion, for it is the same movement, bending in the same direction, that creates both the intellect of the mind and the materiality of things.

3. In addition to these, Bergson encountered Hippolyte Taine's intellectualism (intellectualisme). 'Hippolyte Taine, drawing inspiration from Spinoza, Condillac and Hegel, posited that the various forms assumed by sensations give rise to all human faculties'—8. Ev. cr., p. 225.

9. Émile Brehier: *Histoire de la philosophie*, vol. II, p. 937.

"<9l. "This magnificent world, which surrounds us on all sides with the infinity of time and space and which stirs around us, is a chaotic world filled with the clamour of intertwined

events<ıoı. To move from this intricate, chaotic world to the world of simple elements—that is, sensations: this is

the philosopher's task of analysis. To discover the connection between these elements is to grasp the intellectual relationship between events. This is what it means to recognise. Once the elements have been recognised, the compounds formed by them are also recognised, and thus, through the movements of the simple entity,
are recognised, the characteristics of the complex entity are thereby recognised. By reducing all mental phenomena to sensations, and sensations to motion, Taine thus arrived at a mechanical explanation of consciousness. All sensations consisted of mental atoms which, through their combinations, gave rise to all mental events. Psychic atomism (atomisme psychique) had formed the basis of Taine's intellectualism (intellectualisme).

Bergson criticised the intellectualists both for their conception of the universe and for the value they placed on intelligence. In his view, radical mechanism 'possesses a metaphysics that posits the whole of reality as a monolithic block, established from time immemorial, and regards the apparent duration of things merely as an expression of the impotence and defect of a mind incapable of perceiving everything at once'0 4l.
First and foremost, this system failed to recognise that duration is the fundamental reality. The second error on which the Intellectualists relied was their conception of intellect as the entirety of consciousness. Yet 'if one considers the initial course of the intellect, it is directed towards the creation of artificial objects, and in particular towards the creation of tools that serve to make other tools' 1 0. Ibid. 937.

11. Ibid., p. 938. 12.

Ibid., p. 939.

13. Ibid., 1023.

14. Ev. cr., 42

and the ability to transform it into an infinite variety of forms"<J5l. In fact, "the

evolution of intelligence transforms the tool-making human (homo faber) into the

thinking human (homo sapiens)
. However, even in its evolved state, intelligence cannot go beyond being 'the ability to recognise inanimate matter' for humankind.

It is, however, evident that this system—which holds a mechanistic view of the universe and possesses no other means than intellect to understand reality—cannot attain knowledge of the truth.

4. Bergson was influenced by the evolutionary theories of Darwin and Herbert Spencer. Initially, Lamarck, with his idea of ‘selection’, explained the spread of living beings across the earth in ever-increasing series, in accordance with an ‘internal finality’ (finalité interne) based on the principle of perpetuating their existence in ever-increasing series, thereby shifting minds from the static concept of substance to the dynamic power
. The recognition of the stages of formation in the universe, rather than seeking a static substance within it—that is, moving beyond the static substance of the universe to recognise its dynamic power—first through Hegel, then through Darwin’s concept explaining the spread of life across the earth, and finally through the recognition of the creative power that Bergson termed the ‘life impulse’
, has become the fundamental task of philosophy<l7). From this general idea of becoming (devenir), Boutroux derived his philosophy of contingency, whilst Bergson, drawing on the same principle, developed the concept of ‘libre arbitre’.

Becoming, being free from necessity, brings about our freedom (liberté) in the form of creation and re-emergence.

Herbert Spencer, drawing inspiration from Darwinism, systematised the philosophy of evolutionism. For him, change was the very essence of things.
This innovative line of thought, which abandoned the idea of seeking another essence in the universe, captured the attention of the age. However, the idea of creation (creation) played a dominant role—15. Ev. c:r., 151.

16. Ev. c:r., 224.

17. A. Chide: *Le mobilisme moderne*, 238.

, how could it explain the stages of evolution?

Spencer had, however, sought ‘a formula for universal evolution involving material displacements governed by the laws of mechanics’08l. Bergson, for this reason, strongly criticised Spencer.

He even rejected the claim that a static system arising in this manner could be considered evolutionary. In his view, Spencer was not as alien to Kant as was commonly assumed. He “had certainly sensed, upon his first encounter with the biological sciences, the direction in which philosophy might continue its course, whilst bearing Kant’s criticisms in mind”
"<J9l. According to Bergson, "Spencer’s method simply
trick consisted of bringing about evolution by assembling the parts that had themselves evolved”<101.

The matter was as follows: I stick a picture onto a piece of cardboard and then cut it up; by reassembling the cut-out pieces, the picture I had originally stuck onto the cardboard is recreated <111. Spencer ‘takes reality, which has essentially evolved. He breaks it down into small pieces.

He then reassembles these parts to produce the same reality”<22l.
Thus, nothing is actually explained. For whilst Spencer sought to explain evolution, he was once again relying on the very idea of evolution.

5. The delusion of seeking a substance in the cosmos—that myth of philosophy which had persisted for centuries—had vanished from the realm of living beings, and the turn had come to the world of the soul
. The basis for his ideas concerning the existence, not of a static substance within the soul, but of a dynamic power consisting of continuous becoming (devenir) over time, Bergson sought in the spiritualist positivism (positivisme spiritualiste) of his mentors, Lachelier and Boutroux. Lachelier had sought a psychological foundation for philosophy, drawing on the psychology of Victor Cousin.

1 8. Émile Bréhier: Histoire de la philosophie, vol. II, 926. 1 9. Ev.

cr., 393.

20. Ev. cr., 393.

2 1. Continued.

22. Ev. cr., VI–VII.

He categorically distinguished the existence of consciousness from the external world. According to him, consciousness is an entirely new reality set against the external world, which consists solely of space. It must never be confused with the object. It is, above all else,

‘the will to be’; it is not a substance in space, but a formation in time, and at its highest level, it manifests itself as freedom. If we are to seek the foundations of this inner reality set out by Lachelier, we must go back as far as Fichte. The idea of the ‘self’ (moi) opposing the ‘non-self’ (non moi) found its expression for the first time, in all its originality, in the latter.
In France, Maine de Biran referred to that unique (sui generis) power, which flows from within us outwards in the form of feeling, as ‘internal effort’ (effort intérieur). Following in the same footsteps, Lachelier arrived at a philosophy that abolished the concept of ‘substance’. He regarded psychology and metaphysics as two distinct sciences that complemented one another, and made psychology
as the foundation of metaphysics: “Psychology operates within the realm of sensory consciousness. All its knowledge of thought consists in the recognition of the light

. The true science of thought itself, the recognition of light at its very source—this is metaphysics”<23).

Emile Boutroux had demonstrated that the element of contingency—which stands in opposition to the determinism found in cosmic events—increases gradually as it ascends from matter to living beings, and from living beings to the world of the spirit, ultimately giving rise to freedom in human beings. ‘The only thing that is free is the formation of our character’<24), he said. We see that what appears merely as a state of contingency in the events of the external world becomes, in our inner life, an infinite power that constitutes the very root of our existence:

“Setting aside the external perspective in which things appear as unchanging and limited realities, we turn to the very 23. 1. Lachelier: Psychologie et métaphysique, 1 72–3.

24. Emile Boutroux: On the Contingency of the Laws of Nature, 1, p. 41.

and, if possible, trace our existence right back to its very source

, we find there an infinite power of freedom. Whenever we act in a truly genuine manner, we attain the sense of this power"
<heat.

Bergson was under the influence of these latter thinkers when he began his philosophy. Through the concepts of the immediate given (donnée immédiate), becoming (devenir) and

concrete duration (durée concrète)—which form the foundation of his philosophy—and the meaning of freedom (liberté) emerged from these influences. In addition to these, we may also mention a number of other thinkers whose modes of thought bear more or less resemblance to Bergson's. Höffding, due to the importance Bergson attached to 'immediate given' (donnée immédiate),

spontaneous life and perception set against thought, which reminded him of a series of French writers

and, even if he had not been influenced by them, he associated himself with this kind of mindset that occasionally appears in France's intellectual life

: 'First, we see Montaigne. Behind scepticism (scepticisme), we find a conciliatory attitude towards nature (Mother Nature), which lives spontaneously within all of us and in everyone, according to its own course. Nature, which is within us and above us, cannot be expressed with the aid of our fixed and definite concepts. Pascal, too, contrasts the direct experience of the heart with abstract proof, and the refined mindset with the geometric mindset. The subtle mind perceives the essence of a thing in a single stroke and at a single glance; the geometric mind understands it only at the end of a series of deductions. In this respect, there is a similarity between nature and culture, emotion and intellect, and accumulation and

dispersion.

Maine de Biran distinguishes between the various degrees of spontaneous existence in animal life, human life and the life of the mind; ta-25. The same work; 1 56.

It discusses at length the ‘inner man’, who can never be expressed in the manner commonly understood. The line tracing the evolution of this line of thought from Maine de Biran
passing through Felix Ravaisson, Lachelier and Boutroux, culminates in Bergson. Bergson’s ideas are also reminiscent of Guyau’s.

The latter placed particular emphasis on the dissemination and propagation of spiritual forces.

In his view, thought played only a secondary role. ‘In his poem “The Poet’s Agony”, he depicted the agony he experienced due to the impossibility of expressing the wholeness of life through dreams’ (p. 261.

26. Harald Hötl: La Philosophie de Bergson, 21–22.

28

II. WORKS

Among philosophers, the names most frequently encountered in Bergson’s works are those of Plato and Kant, whom he addressed primarily with the aim of criticising their systems on fundamental points
Plato and Kant. From Plato to Kant, and indeed right up to his own time, Bergson’s complaint against all the ancient philosophies is as follows:

‘All these systems accept that it is possible to provide a complete and accurate interpretation of reality through a chain of concepts and laws; this amounts to recognising the principle of equivalence between being and abstract thought. Within the dualism or parallelism of being and thought, the first term—being—immediately vanishes for the sake of the second, namely thought. Thus, they arrive at absolute monism, whether intellectualist or materialist: reality consists solely of law. This, above all, amounts to eliminating the becoming of the external world"<27).

The aim of philosophies employing the method of reduction was to arrive at a universal mechanism. Everything in the cosmos was explained by rigid laws.

27. Emile Rideau: Les rapports de la matière et de l’esprit dans le Bergsonisme, 1 O.

29

WORKS

“These intellectual philosophers do not understand life or living beings; they reduce living beings to static categories or confine them within formulas; whereas life is a creative force, it is creation and freedom.

Furthermore, by failing to express either its freedom, its continuity, or its creative dynamism , thereby distorting and altering the life of consciousness. They reduce thought to a series of discontinuous concepts … In this passive state of contemplation, our freedom fades away: its very reason for existence is lost, for there is nothing left to create. This trend is ‘a victory won by mechanism over life’ (28).

Faced with this line of thought from ancient philosophy, the philosopher rebels and sets forth his own antithesis: “An inner self-evidence directly experienced at the sources of experience, which cannot be reduced to abstract thought and which affirms the existence of an event that reveals the mystery and infinity of the mind : Duration is freedom”<29>. Bergson accepted duration as a creative principle, and it became the starting point of his philosophy. Thanks to this principle the luminosity that pervades the work he produced and the astonishing breadth of this work—let us hear this once more in Rideau’s own words: In Bergson’s work, “the call is anguished, the answer serene: this is more than mere inner curiosity and restlessness (inquierude); it is, as it were, a speaking thought; the intuition of the depths is illuminated : a powerfully disciplined thought, often a light that masters excitement and reins in lyricism. Bergson has not intensely ; he is a scholar who knows how to observe, yet his laboratory is all of life and the whole world”.

To gain a general idea of the extensive body of work that Bergson, a philosopher who has touched upon many of philosophy’s issues within his system, has produced in the history of philosophy, one should consult his 28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30

it would be useful to briefly familiarise oneself with the issues addressed in each of these works, following the order in which they were published.

Bergson submitted his book *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience) to the Sorbonne in 1888 as his doctoral thesis.

In this work, Bergson addressed the concept of
—which is the sole reality for us—that is experienced by consciousness. He contrasted this concept of pure duration, which has never been confused with spatial concepts, with the concept of space (étendue). In this way, he distinguished the data of inner experience from those of outer experience. Inner experience provides us directly with the concept of 'duration'. Duration is the sole reality. Whatever the ancient philosophers called 'substance', according to Bergson, is duration. 'Outside the duration of consciousness, nothing exists of its own accord. Even space and entities
must be regarded as belonging to personal duration"<30>.

The succession of things is merely an appearance. 'Within our self, there is a succession (flow) that does not exclude one another; outside the self, there is a formation of things outside one another, unrelated to succession'<3J). Bergson reached full idealism only by attributing the data of external experience to the duration of which we bear witness in consciousness
, he arrived at a form of pure idealism. In a letter to Höffding,
he described the place he accorded to duration in his system as follows: "In my view, any summary of my views that does not rest upon—and does not constantly return to—that which I regard, above all else, as the very centre of the doctrine will undermine the whole and thereby expose it to a host of objections. This
centre is the intuition of time"<32).

30. Ibid., 33.

3 1. Don. im., 82.

32. Harold Höffding: La Philosophie de Bergson, 160.

One of the direct givens of consciousness is freedom.

Freedom, which is first and foremost a psychological reality at its core, is the work of duration. Within duration, consciousness creates itself at every moment through its own events. Creativity, in turn, serves as the clear evidence of our freedom. *Donnees im* (mediates) was written to achieve this aim. In the final section of his work, Bergson dispelled both the error of the determinists and the illusion of *libre arbitre*.

Freedom is the most evident reality in our lives. Yet it is impossible to reduce it to natural causes. For it is 'the relationship between the concrete self and the movement it brings about itself'.
Since we are free, it is impossible to define this relationship. Indeed, a thing can be analysed, but an evolution cannot be analysed"<33J. In it, change is a constant feature.

It is evident that the aim of this work is to arrive at an explanation of the concept of freedom. The idea of writing a work on this subject was suggested to Bergson by his mentor, Jules Lachelier.

In the work, one senses the influence that passed from Kant to Bergson via Lachelier's book *The Foundation of Induction*: in this book, Bergson arbitre thesis against the antithesis of determinism. And by demonstrating the fallacy of both opposing theories, he created an antinomy in the Kantian style. Through the synthesis he subsequently presented, he arrived at the idea that lived freedom is the true reality.

Seven years after *Donnees im(mediate s)*, Bergson published *Matter and Memory* He published *Matière et mémoire*. In this work, the philosopher broke away from the idealism that posits consciousness as arising directly from data. By investigating the relationship between mind and body, he treated both as self-existent realities (*réalité en soi*). The realism set out in *Matière et mémoire* (* *) takes the form of dualism (*dualisme*). Higher 33.
Don. im., 167. 32

BERGSON

it will be necessary to await ‘Creative Evolution’ in order to establish unity on a single plane.

Matter and memory treat matter as a heap of images. ‘What is meant by the word “image” is more than what idealism calls a “representation”, yet less than what realism calls a “thing”’ (1341). Matter is an image existing in and of itself (en soi). If matter, is placed at the midpoint of the path between the geometric space (étendu) discussed by Descartes and the interior of the mind, which is drawn towards Berkeley’s ‘pure idea’ (pure idée), that is, at the point where the sens commun perceives it, then metaphysics would not have been sacrificed to physics. This would also be the truest meaning of matter<Jsı.

As for the relationship between mind and matter, or between the state of consciousness and the brain, it is an undeniable reality. But is this relationship not akin to that
? No parallel can ever be drawn between consciousness and the brain—that is, between two series, one psychological and the other physiological—

(36l.

‘Matter and Memory’ is a refutation of both materialism and mentalism and phenomenism (phenomenisme). In this book, Bergson sets out the issues of ‘pure perception’ and ‘pure memory’ and explains his theory of the unconscious. According to him, the unconscious consists of
experienced but which, as they do not concern our practical interests at present, have been relegated to the background of consciousness; they are the existence within us of these images of which we are unaware.

Şekip Tunç states that *Matter and Memory* is the work among Bergson’s writings that has been understood by the general public the latest and with the greatest difficulty.

34. Mat. mem., ll.

35. Mat. mem., IV.

36. Mat. mem., XI.

Conversely, in the realm of ideas, ‘this work has gained great acclaim and given rise to a new intellectual movement. For instance, a distinguished thinker such as William James, having become acquainted with Bergson through this work, wrote to him in a letter announcing that his book had brought about a Copernican revolution. In contrast to the public’s
, the astonishment and admiration of certain exceptional scholars beautifully illustrate the nature of the work *Matter and Memory*. In this work, Bergson demonstrates the power of a scholar-discoverer rather than merely a formulator of ideas.

For this reason, *Matter and Memory* has taken its place among the most serious scholarly works that steer scientific research in new directions"<37>.

In 1900, his book *Laughter* (*Le rire*) was published.

This short essay explores the meaning of the comic and the causes of laughter. Foremost among these causes is the expression of a psychological phenomenon through purely mechanical movements. In this book, we find Bergson’s view of art and his aesthetic theory. According to Bergson, art is the unveiling of life as it truly is, stripped of the veil of self-interest. This is the essence of art.

Seven years later, Bergson published *Creative Evolution* (*Évolution créatrice*). In this work, which resembles a grand and complete novel of the creation of the universe, we see a return from the realism of *Matter and Memory* to idealism. In terms of its style and the beauty of its metaphors, this work also possesses significant artistic merit. Amidst the multitude of issues addressed within it, the explanation of beings through the ‘impulse of life’—the central theme—compels us to regard this book as the core of Bergson’s system. The roots of this system lay in the concept of ‘duration’ (duree), which constitutes the direct subject matter of consciousness
. Creative evolution is the main trunk of this tree; his other works resemble the branches sprouting from it.

37. Mustafa Şekip Tunç: A Few Lectures on Bergson and Spiritual Power, 26.

Creative evolution unveils the history of life in our world, defining the given within duration; it virtually brings about the phenomenology of matter and spirit.

In the work, the universe is an organic whole; it is not yet spatial. Throughout its own history, it undergoes evolution by continually acquiring new forms of life. The pure duration governing this evolution is “the essence of both our own existence and the objects with which we are in relation

’ (38l). Within pure time, we sense that both ourselves and everything alongside us are evolving (39l).

Creative evolution explores the ideal emergence of matter. Bergson describes matter as “the universal reciprocal movement of elements

movement of elements’ (40l). Matter is continuous; it consists of vibrations of infinite speed. Although it is spread throughout space, it is not absolutely bound to any particular location.

As for life, everything in the universe is its work, and logically, life is what existed first. Bergson uses the following terms when describing the characteristics of life: creative power (41), continuous creation, tension, free movement (42), growth (43), continuous effusion (44), and impulse (45).

The duality of matter and life, which appear to possess distinct and opposing characteristics, ultimately unites within a synthesis that will abolish this duality: ‘cosmology is psychology turned back upon itself’ (46l).

38. Ev. cr., 42.

39. Ev. cr., 50.

40. Ev. cr., 205, 221, 226.

4 1. Ev. cr., 237.

42. Ev. cr., 243.

43. Parliamentary Proceedings, 262.

44. Parliamentary Proceedings, 270.

45. Parliamentary Proceedings, 273, 283.

46. Ev. cr., 227.

Matter is a reduced form of life, the habit of life; it is a definite, yet even within its rigidity, a gesture brought to life by the movement of life. The instability and mutability of forms in our solar system stem from this<47>. In the material realm, these variations in form—arising from the synthesis of matter with life—manifest themselves in the world of living beings as organisation. The evolution of living beings, with the aim of organisation, proceeds by making leaps. During this evolution, matter is an obstacle deliberately created by life. It serves as a support for the life impulse so that it does not lose itself in the void

; the impulse of life derives its speed from it. Just as resistance is necessary for a bomb to explode, so too is the obstacle of matter indispensable for the impulse of life.

How does consciousness arise? Life, moving in a scattered manner throughout the entirety of matter, takes on a physical form in certain places. It makes sudden leaps of intensity that could never have been foreseen; in this way, it progresses towards higher forms; the complexity of the nervous system and the brain gradually emerges: humanity appears at the pinnacle of evolution. Throughout history, conscious human beings have striven to transcend matter and free themselves from its influence. Man is the voice of things, the word of the universe. Finally, on this distinguished path of life's evolution leading up to man, a
division is emerging: intellect and intuition are separating within humanity<4S>, and the same driving force is constantly propelling all living beings forward, against the direction in which matter is moving: 'All living beings stand firm, and all surrender themselves to the same terrifying pressure. The animal is increasingly seeking a point of support; man gallops across the animal kingdom; and all of humanity, in space and time, each of us 47. Ev. cr., 264.

48th House cr., 286–293."

‘It resembles a vast army galloping at full gallop, capable of breaking through all resistance and surmounting many obstacles—and perhaps even overcoming death itself—driven by the pull of a sacred duty, right beside us, before us and behind us’<49l.

Bergson published ‘Duration and Simultaneity’ (Duree et simultanéité) in response to Einstein’s view that the concept of time was an illusion.
According to Bergson, duration is the true reality. It is, above all

is, above all, creativity; it is the very reality of becoming in the universe. The time we conceive of outside ourselves—that is, in space—is mathematical time. It is not real time; it has been invented by us. Its existence has been conceived and accepted as ‘real’ through the division of space. When we set off from one place to another, we might say, for example, ‘three hours have passed’. In reality, nothing has passed in the world of things. The experience, maturation and accumulation of events in our consciousness create within us the conception of the passage of time. In the world of things there is only simultaneity (simultanéité), whilst in the mind there is only duration (durée).

After a period of seclusion, which he entered due to his illness but which lasted seven or eight years, Bergson published his book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (Les deux
sources de la morale et de la religion).

It was a tradition of ancient philosophy for metaphysicians to complete and close the circle of their systems by finally addressing ethics and aesthetics. Bergson followed the tradition of philosophers in this respect. Before embarking on an analysis of this book, it must be noted that Bergson did not establish an ethics based on intuition—his own method—but rather carried out a philosophical critique amongst systems of historical values. Indeed, traces of intuition
are not entirely absent. However, the creative power of intuition has been virtually erased and greatly diminished in Bergson’s views on both ethics, , and religion. Now,
49. Ev. cr., 294.

Let us attempt to provide an accurate and text-faithful summary of the work: Bergson links ethics to a sense of obligation grounded in a social foundation<50> and believes in the existence of a social self<51>. Moral obligation takes us beyond reason<52> and makes us free (53). We must distinguish between two kinds of ethics: one is social ethics, the other is human ethics. Between these two, there is not merely a difference of degree, as between society and humanity<54>, but a difference of nature<55). One cannot pass from one to the other through the expansion and extension of the self<56>. We are bound to the first form of ethics when we feel compelled, and to the second when we create the sense of obligation within ourselves. However, those who possess human ethics are only those who have attained love through heroism. We find the strongest expression of this ethics in religions. Essentially, the greatest representatives of human ethics have been the prophets and the saints. Those who possess social ethics have closed minds; those who possess human ethics, on the other hand, have open minds. The morality of the Gospel is, in the fullest sense, the morality of the open spirit <57>. Socrates, too, was a man on a par with Jesus <5B>.

It was only eighteen centuries after Christianity had put forward the idea of universal brotherhood that the American and French Revolutions spread the idea that human rights take precedence over citizens' rights throughout the world <59>. The idea of expansion and growth stems from the Judeo-Christian tradition (60).

50. Mor. rel., 8.

5 1. Mor. rel., 10.

52. Mor. rel., 18, 20.

53. Mor. rel., 24.

54. Mor. rel., 28.

55. Mor. rel., 31.

56. Mor. rel., 34.

57. Mor. rel., 56.

58. Mor. rel., 6.

59. Mor. rel., 77.

60. Purple rel., 78.

BERGSON

Religions must also be divided into two groups: static and dynamic. Mankind's earliest religions were static religions. Religion was, first and foremost, a protective reaction of nature
<6 Il. From another perspective, religion is nature's protective reaction against the intellect's conception that escape from death is impossible<62l. Faith means security. The true origin of faith is not fear, but security against fear<63l. Human beings strive to free themselves from fear through their intellect, but this is not enough;

; hope is also necessary<64>. Religion is, in essence, a dynamic force<65>. A definition of static religion might be as follows: it is nature's protective response to things that, if reason were applied, could be harmful to the individual and destructive to society<66>. Static religion bound the individual to society. Dynamic religion separates them from it and binds them to humanity. The most powerful representatives of this religion are the great mystics<67>. A great mystic is an individual who transcends the material limitations of the human race and perpetuates the divine movement within themselves<68>.

Full mysticism is movement that has attained perfection. We do not encounter this full mysticism in Greece or
India (69). However, Christian mystics have reached a certain level<70>. Mysticism does not mean that the soul remains in darkness and mystery. On the contrary, the mystical state is a state of attaining complete enlightenment. Yet there is a phase of transition through darkness

. At the beginning of the mystical state, a person unites with God through thought and feeling. Only their will remains outside of it.

6 1. Mor. re/., 1 27

62. Mor. re/., 1 37.

63. Mor. re/., 160.

64. Mor. re/., I 73.

65. Mor. re/., 213.

66. Mor. re/., 2 1 9.

67. Mor. re/., 225.

68. Mor. re/., 235.

69. Mor. re/., 242.

70. Purple. re/., 243.

Then, when God acts upon the mystic, union is complete<71
). The relationship of religion to mysticism is like that of vulgarisation to science<72>. Christian mysticism was prepared by the Prophets of the Children of Israel<73>. The strongest reason for the assurance of souls who believe in the Hereafter is that a large part of their actions has no connection with the body<74>.

'The universe is a machine created by God'<7S>. The human being—whether a citizen, a soldier or a worker—remains within the order of nature; when he becomes divine, he rises above animality. What the great mystics tell us is that God—who is the One and the Creator, and who is also in contact with the spirits—elevates man above nature. God, who promises the spirits an eternal destiny, also unites humankind with the waters of the universe.

Bergson's technique of antinomies, reminiscent of Kant's philosophy, is also evident in this book: the antinomy of closed morality and open morality. However, on this occasion, we find a grain of truth in both the thesis and the antithesis. In the work, social pressure and the call of conscience, possessing equal power of influence, determine our course of action. Whilst intellectualism in ethics is explicitly and absolutely rejected, the work is dominated not by revelations based on intuition

psychological or conceptual analyses, rather than revelations based on intuition, prevail. In this book, Bergson felt the need for intuition on only one occasion: to demonstrate that the mystical experience was authentic and true. Yet Bergson himself knew that he had not undergone such an experience. He was not a mystic . So of what intuition is he speaking? What he refers to, if anything, is a secondary intuition felt within the context of the mystical experience, that is, the spirits 7 1. Mor. rel., 246–249.

72. Mor. rel., 255.

73. Mor rel., 256–257.

74. Mor. rel., 283.

75. Mor. rel., 343.

is an intuition brought about by the act of approaching. The true mystical intuition may be the work of divine inspiration and revelation.

In addition to these works, from which we have provided a summary of the ideas they contain, Bergson has published a two-volume collection of his lectures delivered at various times and his studies published in various journals. The first of these books consists of a few lectures based on studies prepared on the fundamental issues of the period between 1901 and 1913
. Published under the title *Spiritual Energy* (*Energie spirituelle*), this volume contains seven articles. This volume addresses fundamental issues of interest to both psychology and philosophy—such as consciousness and life, the relationship between mind and body, the recollection of states of mind, dreams and the effort of zakat—some of which Bergson had previously explored in his earlier works. These articles play a significant role in the full and accurate understanding of Bergson’s system.

Bergson had published *Psychic Energy* in 1919. The book constituting the second volume of his lectures and articles, however, was not published until 1934 under the title *Thought and the Moving* (La Pensee et le mouvant).

Thought and the Moving (La Pensee et le mouvant), was not published until 1934.

This book is Bergson's last published work. It comprises eight articles consisting of

and lectures delivered in various academic circles. Most of the essays in this volume explain intuition (intuition), the method of Bergson's philosophy, and set out his critiques concerning the origin of knowledge and the system. We may say that it is impossible to form complete and definitive judgements about Bergson's philosophy without reading these articles, which directly address the method and the fundamental tenets of intuitionism . It is also certain that Bergson has attained a level of expression in his articles that is clearer and more definitive than in his books . We find that the ideas he expressed in his books in a rather

scattered manner

are presented in a rather scattered manner; in his articles, we find these ideas gathered together in a coherent unity specific to the subject matter of the articles. Among these, the articles entitled 'Philosophical Intuition' (Intuition philosophique) and 'Introduction to Metaphysics' (Introduction à la métaphysique) are the principal writings devoted to a highly systematic examination of the method of intuition

and which also possess a high degree of dialectical value. 42

III. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

We may summarise the general characteristics common to all the philosophical currents that dominated the world of thought prior to Bergson as follows:

A. Ever since the Greeks, philosophy has sought an eternal, static and unchanging substance in the universe. To break down the great barrier between consciousness and the substance of things

: the philosophers' endeavours had long been directed towards this end. For this reason, the philosopher had at times resembled a soothsayer, and for the same reason, philosophy had often severed its ties with other branches of knowledge. This way of thinking divided minds into two worlds: one
that which is with us (immanent) and that which is not with us—necessarily beyond our powers and lying outside the scope of all our experience and thought (transcendent)—and
separation of these two worlds—oneimmanent with us, the other not present with us, necessarily beyond our powers and outside all our experiences and thoughts—and to the idea that there are oppositions between them that make transition from one to the other impossible.

B. The idea that reason is the sole means of recognising truth also originated with Greek rationalism. Like traditional philosophy, Cartesianism and Kantianism have attempted to utilise reason in various ways in the search for truth; philosophers have regarded this sole 43

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
. When, in Kant, reason became mired in the impasse of the noumenon's unknowability (inconnaissable), philosophy's quest for truth had turned into a futile endeavour. After Kant, the efforts made by German idealists such as Schelling and Fichte to rescue philosophy from the darkness into which it had fallen—their attempts to find a means other than reason
to bridge the gap between the external world and our psychological constitution directly; since these ideas were the product not of lived experience but once again of abstractions made by reason, they cannot be said to have put an end to the tradition of reason-based philosophy
cannot be said to have brought the tradition of intellect-based philosophy to an end. Indeed, after them, this intellectualist philosophy was continued by philosophers such as Hamelin, Renouvier and Hippolyte Taine.

C. A third characteristic of ancient philosophy was its determinism. Philosophers, driven by a constant curiosity to construct closed systems, felt compelled to explain all events through specific causes. For this reason, the fundamental distinction between philosophy and science
is essentially no difference in their mode of thought

; however, in the search for causes, the philosopher—unlike the natural scientist—was able to move freely, operating in a broader laboratory, the universe
, and use whatever kind of causes they wished in their explanations; they had become inhabitants of a realm with boundless horizons. However,

these causes must, of course, be capable of being linked to an event outside ourselves. Thus, there remained not a difference in nature but only a difference in degree between the philosopher's work and the scientist's work. Yet, whilst the scientist could not go beyond empirical data at the end of his work, the philosopher, having emerged from a system in which he was ultimately compelled to utilise all manner of causes, could reach an ideal goal . In other words, there was a difference in kind (heterogeneity) between the results he attained through his method of proof and his means
were fundamentally different (heterogeneous).

Thus, the principles and approach of ancient philosophy, which we have sought

to summarise in three points, 44 BERGSON

principles and approach of ancient philosophy, as summarised in three points, have presented the philosopher with three questions within the scope of Bergson's research: What is reality? How can it be recognised? How is metaphysics possible?

Let us now attempt to understand Bergson's system by summarising his views on these three issues: 1. Bergson began by demonstrating the error of ancient philosophy, which sought an unchanging substance in the universe. In Greece, the Eleatic school
denied all forms of duration (76). Plato and Aristotle, by identifying ideas and forms in the universe, likewise denied continuous becoming<77). Greek philosophy, too, like the 'Sens commun', had regarded the phenomenon of change as the work of immobile elements<78>. The entire value of modern knowledge lies in the fact that it has replaced Aristotle's statism with dynamism. Modern sciences, beginning with the discoveries of Galileo and Copernicus, began to explain events through the medium of time<79>.
Thus, the importance accorded to the concept of time in scientific explanations was sufficient to reveal that there is no static and immutable substance in the universe. Bergson argues that philosophy must now bid farewell to the search for substance<so1. In his view, the most evident thing in the world is duration. The universe is in a state of duration
<s 1 1.

Two opposing types of movement are observed in the universe: one is 'descent', the other is 'ascent'. The former does nothing other than unravelling a prepared ball of yarn. This movement can occur suddenly, as in a spring that is suddenly released. However, internal maturation—

76. Ev. cr., 339.

77. Ev. cr., 342.

78. Ev. cr., 333.

79. Ev. cr., 361.

80. At the same time, he feels the need to clarify that he does not deny the essence. ‘We accept that entities retain their own specific existence,’ he says. Pen. nıou. 238.

8 1. Ev. cr., II.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH, and the second, corresponding to the activity of creation
The second, corresponding to this activity, is essentially the driving force and forcibly imposes its own rhythm upon the first movement, from which it cannot be separated. Of these two movements, ‘descent’ is the movement to which matter is subject, whilst ‘ascent’ is the movement to which life is subject.

Let it not be thought that matter is motionless. Its rigidity is apparent and relative to our senses. If all the symbols, which are the work of the intellect, are swept away from it, and its essence, having shed its oppressive rigid shell, settles into the deep reality of the material world whilst in motion, it is seen that its simple flow (flux), its pure becoming

(devenir pur), and living currents of time merge into rivers that are inseparable from one another<S3l. The movement of emergence to which life is subject, however,
is the movement that governs evolution in the cosmos. Life, which was undoubtedly the first to exist in the cosmos, is situated at the beginning of the movement of emergence and at the dawn of evolution. When life, during the course of evolution—which is constant creativity—encounters obstacles that seek to halt its movement in certain places, it branches out and continues to advance along several paths. The series of living beings has come into being as the result of such a division, and each branch, whilst making advances (e/an) during its continuous movement<S4l, progresses by following its own internal purpose (finalité interne)<ssı. At the pinnacle of this evolutionary line and at the end of a great leap, humankind appears in the universe. Essentially, the evolution that shapes the forms of life

, evolution is simultaneously and gradually, one by one, creating the ideas that will enable the intellect to comprehend it<B6l. Life is, in fact, something belonging to the spiritual order<S7l and, at the pinnacle of its emergence, has brought to light the reality of the spirit latent within it.

82. Ev. cr., ı 2.

83. Penido: La méthode intuitive de M. Bergson, p. 105.

84. Ev. cr., 279.

85. Ev. cr., 44.

86. Ev. cr., 112.

87. Ev. cr., 273.

We have seen that all entities in the universe come into being through duration. The only entity possessing true duration, however, is our self. Our self is form, it is original and new. Its states cannot be predetermined; for none of its states has ever been apprehended beforehand<BB>. Duration appears in consciousness as unity amidst multiplicity. More precisely, it is lived unity. Multiplicity can only conceived in space. True time is our inner life. Around us and within us, the true reality is fluidity (mobility)<S9>. Spiritual life is a reality possessing originality, which, whilst unfolding, acquires new qualities at every moment; it is a constant gushing forth of novelties, comprising an organised process of mutual dissolution— the exact opposite of succession by juxtaposition— a reality possessing originality. In the spirit, all elements intermingle. They dissolve into one another in an endless series of vibrations. The past and the present are always present together; both surge forward and prepare the future. This is precisely how it is when we sense that our own existence<90> and the fabric of reality<91> are one and the same. Yet the difficulty of understanding this is evident. Our consciousness cannot comprehend a succession other than that of a single kind of time.

True time cannot be conceived; it can only be lived<92>, constituting the essence of consciousness and life.

This is precisely the duration that Bergson presents as fundamental reality. The philosophy of time has rendered the search for a substance external to and transcendent upon the universe superfluous. Since everything is within time and everything consists of time, we are compelled to resolve all the problems of metaphysics through immanence. How is this possible? In other words, reality be recognised?

88. Ev. cr., 1.

89. Pen. mou., I 89.

90. Ev. cr., 262.

91. Ev. cr., 295, 299, 390.

92. Ev. cr., 50.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 2. Bergson said, “Philosophy
is a simple matter’ (93). ‘A philosopher worthy of the name has said only one thing in his entire life’ (94). What the philosopher has to say in the face of reality is ‘infinitely simple’—so simple that it is
. It is for this very reason that he has spent his entire life trying to grasp it

. Once he has formulated what he holds in his mind, he has always felt compelled to correct the formula he has put forward, and then to correct that correction as well... The entire complexity of his doctrine, which leads towards the infinite, stems from the disproportion between his own simple intuition and the means he employs to express it (95). We inevitably express this infinitely simple reality through words. Yet words are merely symbols of reality. We then mistake the very content of these symbols—as grasped by the intellect—for the truth itself. And we confuse the expression with the reality to which it relates, the symbol with the thing itself. In this way, we sever our connection with reality.
Bergson’s spiritualism was an endeavour to free reality from the constraints imposed by the structure of the intellect

(96). Bergson realised that this highly lucid and fluid realm (97) cannot be recognised through the medium of the intellect.
His 'irrationalist' philosophy (98), shaped by the influence of Boutroux's philosophy of contingency, regards 'rationalist' philosophy as nothing more than a form of symbolism. On the other hand, Bergson acknowledges the impotence of empiricism in this regard. Empiricism accepts that sensations reveal reality. However: a) Sensations are scattered; they cannot provide comprehensive knowledge. In consciousness 93. Pen. mou., 159.

94. Pen. mou., 141.

95. Pen. mou., 137.

96. Brehier: Histoire de la philosophie, vol. II, 1026.

97. Hilmi Ziya Ülken: Philosophers of the Twentieth Century, 208.

98. Ibid., II.

there is unity; the otherness and multiplicity of sensations cannot be reduced
. Here, another process is required to ensure this unity. From reality, which consists of a continuous flow, sensations can only
static perceptions.

b) Essentially, our senses are the means by which we adapt to the external world; they are instruments of self-interest. They ensure that we benefit from the external world and utilise nature for our own ends. Their purpose is entirely distinct from leading us to the truth.

In the sciences, experiments are conducted by means of the sensations we derive from objects and by establishing quantitative relationships between them. The criticisms levelled at sensations can also be applied to them:

a) The differences observed in the methods of the sciences also distinguish them from one another in terms of their aims. Each science, by focusing on its own subject matter, classifies all the

qualities pertaining to that subject and explains the phenomena. We understand the events that science is to explain by classifying them in relation to our senses. Like the senses, they operate by deriving static perceptions<99) from a reality that is in constant motion.

The sciences analyse reality. ‘Analysis is the process of breaking something down into previously recognised elements, that is, elements common to that thing and other objects. Thus, to analyse is to express one thing in terms of the function of another. Every analysis is a translation. It is an unfolding in the form of symbols’<ıouı.

b) Like the senses, the sciences are pragmatic (pragmatist) in nature (l o ı ı. To master the elements of nature, to use them 99. Pen. mou., 1 5 8.

100. Pen. mou., 205.

101. Ibid., continued.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH.
Science is a means of preparing our minds for action. The movement in question in science, according to Poincaré, is the movement that provides us with convenience (commodity) in explaining postulates, principles and hypotheses. Le Roy states that scientific intellect, just as in common sense (sens commun), seeks practical (manipulable) results. For this reason, the similarity between scientific work and mechanical work is evident. Essentially, every science culminates in a technique that is specific to it and determined by its own subject matter; the aim of science is to attain such a technique. The difference between science and sens commun lies in the fact that scientific knowledge is embedded within a more coherent system of expression than the latter. There is only a difference of degree between these two systems of knowledge, not a difference in nature. Scientific knowledge can provide a clearer and more refined understanding than the other<J02>.

All these criticisms demonstrate that neither rationalism nor empiricism can lead to the truth. According to Bergson, for empiricism, the self is multiplicity; for rationalism, it is unity. Empiricism leads to the denial of the self, reducing it

reduce it to zero; rationalism, by reducing it to infinity (infini), renders it indeterminate. For empiricism seeks to understand the events of consciousness through analysis. It assumes that consciousness
arises from the combination of the parts separated by analysis. This is akin to believing that a translation of a work can take the place of the original. True empiricism is attained by penetrating the essence of the work and experiencing its spirit; this true empiricism is true metaphysics<I03).

Did Bergson, who distinguished philosophy from the sciences by its clear differences, regard it as the systematisation of the sciences at a certain point? Was philosophy, perhaps, a sort of ‘science of the sciences’?

1 02. Edouard le Roy: *La pensée intuitive*, see: the section on science and philosophy.

103. Pen. mou., 220–222.



BERGSON

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Is his answer negative on this point as well? The philosopher perceives a fundamental difference between scientific thought and philosophical
thinking: ‘The truth is that philosophy is not a synthesis of the particular sciences, and if it sometimes operates within the realm of science, gathering the subjects that occupy science into a simpler perspective, this cannot be done in such a way as to impose pressure on science, thereby raising the results of science to a higher degree of generality

. If experience did not present itself to us, on the one hand, in the form of events that are more or less repeated, more or less measurable, distinct multiplicity (multiplicité distincte) and spatiality (spatialité) – events that spread out in these directions and participate in and are added to other events – and, on the other hand, in the form of pure duration that eludes law and measure, manifesting itself as mutual interpenetration (penetration reciproque), there would be no basis for distinguishing between the two forms of knowledge known as philosophy and science. In both cases, experience expresses consciousness; yet in the first, consciousness is turned outwards, and to the extent that it perceives things as distinct from one another, it
to that extent it steps outside itself; in the second case, however, it turns inwards, grasps itself and delves deeper into itself”<l04l. Thus, by
, might it also penetrate into the very heart of matter and life—and, more generally, into reality itself? It is evident that this would not be possible if consciousness were merely superimposed upon matter in an incidental manner. Yet, by living its life to the full,
it is certainly possible: “The matter and life that fill the world are also present within us; we too sense the forces stirring within all beings; whatever the very essence at the heart of everything that exists and is coming into being may be, we too are part of it. Let us therefore descend into our own inner self: the deeper

the point we touch lies the deeper, the more intense will be the force that propels us back to the surface. Philosophical intuition is this contact. Philosophy, then, is precisely this movement”<ı osı.

104. Pen. mou., 1 56.

105. Pen. mou., 1 57.

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH To delve deeper within ourselves, to reach a point within our inner life by delving deeper —what might be the principles upon which this mode of recognising reality is based, and what are the reasons that make such recognition both necessary and possible? We can summarise these reasons under two headings: a) The imperfection of our perceptions. For ‘understanding (concevoir) and reasoning (raisonner) make up for the shortcomings of perception (perception).’ If our understanding were complete and perfect, there would be no need

. The cause that gives rise to philosophy is the inadequacy of our faculty of perception” <I06J.

b) In principle, Bergson demonstrates that man is the measure of all things, and that all forms of reality come into being in accordance with the human type. Man is the law of existence: the epitome of the entire universe (I07).

However, it must not be forgotten that the philosopher began his work with a set of concepts and continually expands these concepts as he progresses. And it is only these concepts, acquired by the intellect, that have elevated intuition to its present level. “Were it not for the intellect, intuition would have remained an instinct, anchored to the practical concerns of existence!

"<ıosı. Thus, intellect—the means of recognising inanimate matter—and intuition—the means of recognising the reality of life—will advance side by side, whilst science and philosophy will complement one another<I O<JJ.

Thus, philosophy is not merely ‘the mind’s turning in upon itself, the coexistence of human consciousness with the vital principle from which it has emerged, and its contact with creative endeavour’. See also 106. Pen. mou., 165–166.

107. Emile Rideau: the work in question, 117.

108. Ev. cr., 193.

No. 109. Ev. cr., 50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 371.

is, in general, the deepening of becoming (devenir), true evolutionism and, consequently, the true cause of science. Provided that the truths established by the term ‘science’ are understood

; otherwise, just as it once progressed around Aristotelian physics, in the second half of the 19th

Thus, Bergson sought to unite science and philosophy in the concept of experience. Bergson's method, 'as his commentators have also shown us, was essentially based on experience: in it, first of all, there is the scientific experiment from which the philosopher
scientific experience, which the philosopher will utilise, refine and transcend. Then there is the metaphysical experience—known as intuition—which, through positive knowledge, possesses the patience to work through the accumulated results and the courage to break away from the mind's spatial habits
—the metaphysical experience, known as intuition, which will reveal the secret of the essence of reality. Bergson sought, above all, to establish a philosophy that was both rigorous in the face of science and
. He believed he had found a method suited to this new philosophy in the experiment of intuition, which is in genuine contact with the scientific experience."< l l l l.

The same author states that Bergson's philosophy presents two facets: on the one hand, it is a philosophy of criticism; on the other, it is a 'cosmological vision'. Bergson applied intuition to the first part of his system, which concerns the intellect, and to the second
part to intuition. Metaphysics serves to unify both forms of experience into a single, comprehensive experience (experience intégrale). 'A philosophy that dissolves intellect within intuition' will provide solutions to numerous issues not only in the realm of thought, but also in the realms of life and movement< 1 1 2ı.

Integral experience, rather than merely extending the experiences of

external events, external 1 1 0. Ev. cr., 3 99.

l l l. Rene Avord: 'Reflections on Bergian Philosophy', Revue du Paris, 1941.

112. Ev. cr., 293.

 lies in and delving deep into it by exploring our own inner selves. Metaphysics can be defined as a complete experience<I I4l.

3. One of the issues Bergsonism addressed was the question of the possibility of metaphysics. In *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, we come across

we come across this significant sentence:

“One must live before one can philosophise” O I 5l. Here, we interpret the word “

’ here is taken to mean deepening our inner experience. The depth and comprehensiveness of Bergson’s psychology stem from his treatment of psychological experience as the foundation of his philosophy. In this regard, Lecombe states that he feels a sense of unease in the face of Bergson’s work: on the one hand, Bergson is ‘an observer capable of capturing inner experience in its purity and presenting it to us in evocative terms, free from the constraints of classical judgements
, capable of capturing inner experience in its purity and introducing it to us through evocative expressions’, whilst on the other hand, he is someone who grapples with metaphysical issues and is keen to establish a new philosophy based on psychology.

‘It is as though, alongside Bergson the psychologist and observer, there were a metaphysician and dialectician driving him on

< I I6>.

Indeed, in what he calls ‘pure experience’—that is, psychological experience—Bergson combined all the findings derived from the sciences that assist our movement< l l7>
. He removed them from the realm of symbolic knowledge pertaining to space. Our psychological existence thus

world, thereby forming a refracting prism.

113. Pen. mou., 206.

114. Pen. mou., 255.

115. Mor. re/, 174.

ı ı 6. Roger Lacombe: La psychologie bergsonienne, 8–9. ı ı 7.

Pen. mou., ı 5 8.

Psychological or inner experience thus constituted the dissolution of the duality between the self and the reality brought close to it. Psychological reality, experienced in its own purity, ultimately yields absolute knowledge of the external world through a sympathetic approach. Psychology culminates in metaphysics. Indeed, one of Bergson's definitions of philosophy
was precisely this: 'A psychology culminating in metaphysics'.

Sympathetic fusion with things provides us with intuition, which is the knowledge of absolute reality. Bergson defines the intuition of entities in the external world as follows:
'We call intuition that mental sympathy which draws us into a being, ensuring our union with that which is unique and indescribable within it.' This sympathetic fusion, known as intuition, identifies consciousness with things. It eliminates the distinction between the spiritual self and material things. It is as though, within intuition, the self and the object acquire the same nature;
the barrier that previously existed between them—and which, in the eyes of the intellect, rendered them irreconcilable—is removed.

According to Bergson, to do philosophy is "to take one's place in the midst of reality in motion and uniting with the simplest, ineffable, untranslatable, most intrinsic aspect of things, and being at one with them' (O I 9l). Bergson himself, when defining metaphysics, states that it is "a means of possessing a reality not relatively but absolutely; of dwelling within it rather than deriving views from it; of receiving intuitions rather than making analyses; and, finally, of grasping it beyond any expression, experience or symbolic conception" (O 101). Rideau, too, reflects on Bergsonism as follows: "Bergsonism is more than a method of thought; it is a world system. However, the framework of this system—

11 8. Pen. mou., 205.

ı ı 9. Penido: La méthode intuitive de M. Bergson, 3 ı . ı 20.

Pen. mou., 206.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH is the movement of the mind itself”02I >. The very nature of the mind, within a philosophy such as Bergsonism that is concrete and
explores the lived experience, also encompasses a worldview. As Paliard puts it, the dialectic arising from the union of the concept of time and reality “is at once both ideal and real; that is to say, the task of philosophy is to test itself in order to rethink an order which is the very product of new thought and which is at the same time the whole of reality as well as the whole of thought”< I 22>. Thus

“the thinking of things is based on the principle of thought thinking itself” (0 23) and idealism attains its fulfilment in lived knowledge through intuition. In phenomenologists—such as Whitehead and the Neo-Augustinians, as well as Bergson—the metaphysics of today, which ‘always explores the concrete, the living, and lived reality’ (024) as a common theme, constitutes a sort of liberation of thought from the bondage of the senses. This metaphysics, which strives never to sever contact with spiritual reality, naturally requires an effort far superior to—and transcending—the normal course of thought in order to grasp truth within this inner experience where the separation between thought and beings is dissolved
. Contact with the reality outside us was as easily possible as it was far from bringing us closer to truth. Contact with the reality that has deepened within us and taken on a life of its own through thought, however, is as difficult as it is conducive to reaching truth. This inner reality stands as an obstacle to the endeavour seeking to grasp it

. This obstacle, which resists thought, is essentially thought itself. It is the inner life formed by the sum of all that has been thought up to that point; it is the entirety of consciousness and the entirety of reality.

To think, however, is to create a new current amidst the dense existence of this reality—1 2 1. Emile Rideau: Le rapport de la matière et de l’esprit dans le Berg-

.wmisme, 173.

1 22. J. Paliard: Intuition and Reflection, 7. 1

23. Paliard, same work, 1 1 3.

1 24. Hilmi Ziya Ülken: Twentieth-Century Philosophers, 1 90.

is the opening of a path for itself; it is the endeavour of a new light, amidst the system of lights, to draw a line sharper than the previous one. The cause of the difficulty encountered by thought lies in the fact that the movement of thought encounters an obstacle of its own kind. It is the ambition to impart a new integrity not only to itself but to the entire spiritual structure.

In this state of motion, thought is impervious to every influence, every enslaving force, the habits of the senses, and every command. It bends to itself and recognises no authority but itself in its progress; it seeks no light other than its own. Once thought has set itself in motion, it is no longer subject to any discipline outside itself, nor does it yield. It does not incline towards the goals to which either science or religion seeks to lead. At the outset, it may perhaps make use of them. But it disregards both their methods and the goals they seek to attain. This is like a force that makes use of peripheral appearances, yet never seeks their aid, never approaches them, never comes into contact with them, but instead ceaselessly carves out its own path in a void, descending ever deeper.

Do we find the pure metaphysical meaning, understood in this way and whose existence we recognise particularly in phenomenologists, fully realised in Bergson? This is the goal to which intuition—the knowledge of concrete existence—will lead us, and Bergson
In describing intuition in the ways mentioned above, he has brought to light all the characteristics that lead the mind to this mode of thought. Experiential knowledge, which moves from concepts to reality, may be the product of pure metaphysics. However, Bergson is not one of the extreme philosophers of pure metaphysics. Indeed, although he is an intuitive philosopher, he has not hesitated to employ reason in many parts of his work, particularly in his critiques. Not only at the outset of the movement of thought, but perhaps at every station where it pauses, in order to gain new momentum, it does not neglect to draw upon the sciences when it slows down. By forming new combinations with the elements it draws from the sciences—that is, by making use of the aid of reason—57

concrete nature within itself, and continues to derive intuitions from it. Thus, the philosopher's deepening within himself occurs by drawing on external aids at every step. Sometimes, as in the case of Matter and Spirit, the compounds formed from elements obtained from the outside prove superior to the analyses of intuition and the philosopher drifts away from being intuitive in his proofs and investigations. René Avord states in this regard: 'Bergson is, rather than an intuitive philosopher, a philosopher who has sensed the inadequacy of reason and the allure of intuition' (025).

In Bergson's metaphysical world—where he has put forward views, whether critical or appreciative, on the principal issues of philosophy and the sciences from Plato to Darwin— his magnificent work—achieved by endeavouring to embrace entirely distinct modes of thought and feeling, whilst at every step drawing upon the findings of modern physics and biology—resembles, rather than a work of pure metaphysics that delves into the mysteries of the universe through the human spirit, a masterpiece by a master architect whose refined style reflects light, capable of creating the most perfect and expansive compositions from motifs that are utterly foreign to one another
, it resembles a Gothic architectural masterpiece by a master architect whose work dazzles the eye: one façade embodying reality and history, the other bringing art and imagination to life.

No. 25. René Avord: Réflexions sur la philosophie bergsonienne, Revue de Paris, No. 94 I.

CHAPTER II:

WHAT IS

INTUITION?

I. THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF INTUITION Before delving into an analysis of Bergsonian intuitionism, we shall briefly discuss the conceptions of intuition that have been put forward to date outside this system, and the various meanings attributed to this term. Indeed, from Cartesian philosophy to Bergsonism, the term 'intuition' has been used in fields that have no connection with one another
, yet when its specific nature is examined, it always refers to the immediate knowledge of the subject of thought presented to the mind

. In this chapter, we shall examine the psychological, aesthetic and mystical meanings of intuition in relation to its forms pertaining to reason or the senses.

Rational intuition

: according to Descartes, intuition is the means of obtaining self-evident ideas; ‘It is the knowledge of a self-evident truth, used as a principle and foundation in reasoning, whatever its nature may be’ >.

Knowledge obtained through intuition is beyond doubt. ‘Intuition is the clear and distinct concept of a pure and attentive mind, which leaves us with no doubt whatsoever regarding what we understand’<11.

The mind’s first movement is not the concept from which sentences are formed, but rather intuitive knowledge and certain truths (3). Descartes 1. André Lalande: Vocabulaire de la philosophie, 396.

2. Emile Béhier: Histoire de la philosophie, vol. II, 57.

3. Ibid., 58.

He contrasts this characterisation of intuition with deduction: whilst deduction is a sequential process, a chaining of propositions, intuition is instantaneous<4>. The simple
natures (natures simples) that are the subject of intuition cannot be subjected to deduction. For ‘the propositions revealed by intuition are things that we cannot
. For example, it is impossible for one and the same thing to both exist and not exist at the same time; –
nothing can come into being from nothing;—there can be nothing in the effect that is more than its cause’<S>. The intuitions pertaining to our consciousness are the same. ‘Whilst we may doubt every kind of content of our consciousness, it is

. For it is the proof that we exist. ‘I think, therefore I am’: this is an intuition obtained directly”<6>.

We have said that the subject of intuition consists of simple entities. These are elements that, and are recognised in their entirety at first contact. There can be no error in our knowledge of them. For to recognise them is to grasp them with an infallible intuition<7>.

Simple essences can be divided into several categories: a) Either they are purely mental concepts, such as substance, order, quantity and thought. These are the intuitions that Descartes primarily had in mind.

The existence of God must also be counted amongst these.

b) Or they are clear (clair) and distinct (distinct) simple perceptions derived from purely material essences, such as shapes, dimensions, positions and movements in space.

distinct simple perceptions derived from purely material entities.

c) Or they are emotional states arising from the union of mind and body, such as appetites, desires and passions. According to these states, intuition is either 4. O. Hamelin: Le système de Descartes, 80.

5. Harald Höffding: Histoire de la philosophie moderne, 226.

6. Ibid., 228.

7. O. Hamelin: *Le système de Descartes*, 87.

pertains to the mind, or to the body, or to the consequences arising from the union of mind and body. Intuition is a means of attaining not only concepts but also truths that are beyond all doubt. That a triangle has three sides

, that a circle has only one surface; if I am thinking, ‘

I must certainly exist. The first principles have thus been obtained directly through intuition<S>. When we speak of intuition
refers not only to truths, but also to the connection between a truth and the truths directly linked to it.
For example: just as 2 + 2 equals 4. Furthermore, through intuition, common concepts are understood.

For example: two things are equal to a third thing<9>.

In all these cases, what constitutes the nature of intuition is the movement of the mind that grasps its subject directly.

This is nothing other than a judgement. However, Descartes' intuition is not a method. A method will show how intuition is to be used in order to avoid falling into error contrary to the truth<10>.

Intuitionism in modern mathematics

In our time, a group of mathematicians, led by Brouwer, have put forward a new understanding of intuition. "They claim that, by resorting to intuition in mathematics, they will overcome many difficulties arising from logical paradoxes by disregarding them and constructing mathematics solely in an intuitive (on intuition-based) manner. For this reason, their approach may also be termed 'constructivism'<• • >.

They accept that many truths of mathematics are arrived at solely as a result of mental activity, without recourse to experiment. How is this possible? This phenomenon demonstrates the power of the human mind. Höffding: His, de la philo. mod., 226.

9. Emile Brehier: History of Philosophy, Vol. II, 59.

10. Ibid., 60.

11. Hilmi Ziya Olken: History of Logic, 192.

THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF INTUITION proves that the mind possesses the power to discover a truth distinct from experience. Without relying on experience, two mathematicians working independently on mathematical problems through pure mental activity alone can arrive at the same results. This phenomenon demonstrates the existence of a 'mind' that is common to all human beings and a 'mind' that leads to truth. 'As Kant also demonstrated, there are certain categories that are common to all human beings and always possess the same character, existing a priori (prior to experience). These emerge only come to light through experience; yet this does not preclude their existence or their a priori nature. These phenomena demonstrate that there exists a reason peculiar to the human species, possessing the same characteristics, and that this reason contains certain truths independently of experience, purely within itself"0 2>.

The new mathematical intuitionists state that 'the series of natural numbers is recognised by intuition in a perfectly appropriate manner; therefore, it would be incorrect to attempt to construct or define them'<J3>. "Heyting, who founded the theory of intuitionism in mathematics, holds the following view: 1. Pure mathematical writing is a free creation of the mind and has no connection whatsoever with empirical phenomena.

2. The image of a mathematical system is inherent in the simple observation of an empirical event.

3. The method of the natural sciences consists, in particular, of gathering the mathematical systems implicit in experiments into a purely mathematical system constructed for this purpose.

However, these are nothing more than a set of rudimentary formulas encountered in philosophy books of recent years. If the matter cannot be made clearer and these theses are not combined with Herbrand and von Neumann's new 'constructivism', such ideas will not be fruitful, just as they were not in the past"<l 4>.

1 2. Alain: Elements de philosophie, 12, 74.

1 3. Hilmi Ziya Ülken: History of Logic, 292.

1 4. Ibid., 2–3.

BERGSON

Kant’s Concept of Intuition

Kant linked intuition to our senses. It is through our intuitions of time and space that we receive sensations from objects. Time and space are the a priori forms of sensibility (formes a priori de la sensibilité) or pure intuitions (intuitions pures).

Some of our intuitions are directed towards events in the external world, whilst others are turned inwards towards our own inner world. The a priori form of our intuitions concerning the external world is space; the form of the intuition concerning our inner events is time. Intuitions derived from
are apprehended through space, whilst those arising from our own internal events are apprehended through time<06>. In this sense, intuition consisted of data (données) derived from the a priori forms of our sensibility.

Psychological intuition

Intuition, in a purely psychological and empirical sense, is the name given to the recognition by ourselves of the mental events we are experiencing. In this sense, it is not a priori and may pertain to any of our mental states. It is the directly acquired knowledge that we are experiencing a mental event. I

knowing that I am thinking, realising the suffering I am experiencing within myself

or being aware that I have made a decision. In this sense, it is the essential character of consciousness. For my acceptance of the existence of a state of consciousness within me is only possible through my awareness that I am experiencing that state. Consciousness is always in need of intuition, and in this sense, it could be said that it is not so much thinking

but rather, perhaps, thinking that one is thinking. Divinatory

intuition

This is most commonly manifested in the field of mathematical sciences. 1 5. Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 65, 71.

16. Ibid., 73, 77.

65

THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF INTUITION: Intuition is the act of reaching a solution to a practical or intellectual problem, after a long search, through a sort of inner enlightenment
instant: this intuition, frequently observed in art, science and technology, is a form of knowing without thought or reasoning—a kind of discovery. Archimedes' 'Eureka!' and Newton's discovery of the law of universal gravitation the moment he saw an apple fall from a tree to the ground are examples of this kind of intuition.

Aesthetic intuition

According to Schelling, the true reality is the Absolute, which is independent of both the self and nature. In nature, both the self and nature derive from the Absolute.
By 'recognition', we must understand the self—having attained freedom—merging with nature through the paths of reason and love. We call the totality of objective things in our knowledge
the totality of objective things in our knowledge is called nature, whilst the totality of subjective things is called the self or intellect.

All knowledge is based on the harmony between the subjective and the objective. How do the subjective and the objective unite, and why do they harmonise with one another?
For in all knowledge, these two terms are found united. Which of them comes first? In other words, does the subjective reach the objective, or does the objective comprehend the subjective? Scientific research prioritises nature—that is, the objective. However,
in terms of its ultimate aim, it inevitably leads to the subjective. For all investigations of nature prove that there is a lawfulness in the universe. "The ultimate perfection of the natural sciences must necessarily be the complete spiritualisation of all natural laws, the laws of intuition and thought. Events (matter)
disappear entirely; only the laws (form) remain"<J7l. "A complete theory of nature is one that reduces it entirely to the intellect.

Nature, generally referred to as inanimate, consists of an imperfect seed of intellect ".
Nature attains full consciousness through man and finds itself 1 7. F. W. Schelling: Essays (translated by Jankelt!vitch), 1 24.

66

BERGSON

attains full consciousness through man and turns in upon itself. Consequently, there is a perfect harmony between intellect and nature<ıs>.

Owing to the harmony between nature and the self, it becomes possible to comprehend the objective world by proceeding from the self. The natural sciences proceed from objective existence, whilst the self proceeds from subjective existence; both converge at a single point. To attain this, the subjective existence must first absolutely deny objective existence. Even when the entire objective world has been denied, existence is reaffirmed through the judgement “I
exist’ reaffirms existence<I 9>. This knowledge, which is absolutely free, does not belong to the category of knowledge derived from evidence, reasoning or concepts. It is an intuition. This knowledge creates its own object. In such an intuition, the creator and the created are one and the same. Schelling refers to such an intuition, Schelling calls ‘intellectual intuition’ (intuition intellectuelle).

The object of intellectual intuition is not external, but is itself. ‘Intellectual intuition’ is the organ of all transcendental thoughts. The self is an object that exists in and of itself, for the self recognises itself.

In other words, the self is a pure intellectual intuition. Since the self is an absolutely free activity, it eludes all forms of proof<20).

How does one pass from this mental intuition to aesthetic intuition? Schelling explains this transition as follows:

In nature, there is an intellect that is not conscious of itself.

In human beings, this intelligence becomes conscious. In a work of art, nature and the self merge. Since a work of art is a conscious creation, it is the product of freedom and, at the same time, the product of nature

and is therefore a creation that is not self-aware. Nature begins without being self-aware and reaches perfection through consciousness. It is teleological (finalistic). The self, however, in its creative activity, is conscious—

p. 8. Ibid.; p. 25. p. 9.

Ibid.; p. 28.

20. Ibid.; pp. 5–52.

THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF INTUITION—that is, subjectively—and ends objectively.

In a work of art, the conscious and the unconscious (the self and the object) unite <111.

The unconscious intelligence found in nature and the conscious intelligence found in humans merge within the work of art. Thus, the eternal harmony that exists between nature and thought, between the ideal and the real, comes into being <22l. It is precisely this harmony, born of the self's
gives rise to aesthetic intuition. 'Aesthetic intuition is nothing other than transcendental intuition turned outwards. Since this is the case, art is the true and eternal organ of philosophy, and at the same time its sole testimony.
For, just as the unconscious plays a role in our actions and in the act of creation

and, just as the unconscious is in fact of the same structure as consciousness, it serves as the constant witness to those states which philosophy cannot express through external forms."

Mystical intuition

The term 'religious intuition' is also used in the same sense. For

'religion is, in essence, mystical. It accepts that the divine being

cannot be reached through the senses or reason
, but only through the heart and the will"
<24l. Roger Bastide also defends the same idea; mysticism lies at the foundation of religion<151. The goal of mysticism manifests itself as the intuition of God<26l. According to Boutroux, the essential event of mysticism is the state of ecstasy (extase). In this state, all connections with the external world are severed. The soul is overcome by the sensation of being connected to an inner reality: this infinite being is God<27>. In all forms of mysticism, this state of ecstasy—2 1.
Ibid. 162–163.

22. Ibid. 132.

23. Ibid., p. 175.

24. Maurice Blondel: *Qu'est-ce que la mystique*, 106–107.

25. Roger Bastide: *Les problèmes de la vie mystique*, 12.

26. J. Man!chal: *Studies on the Psychology of Mystics*, p. 145.

27. Ibid. 1 33.

It is regarded as a fundamental event. The emergence of this state, as described by most of the great mystics, occurs as follows:

‘Existence is emptied of all thought and of every ordinary emotion; it ceases

no longer sustains existence. Yet it does not lose itself in a state of unconsciousness. Other emotions and thoughts arise; yet the mystic no longer feels them as his own, they appear alien to him; he receives them passively. Some, such as Schopenhauer, Maurice Blondel and Delacroix, identified a similar state of mind in aesthetic intuition; others believed they had found it in the contemplation of nature described in Rousseau’s ‘reveries’, or in the diaries of Maine
de Biran and Amiel’s journals. Finally, they thought they had found it in philosophers such as Plotinus, who conceived of knowledge as the identification of the subject with the object. However, others (R.P. Poulain, Montmorand, Pierre Janet) do not accept this sort of approach”<28>. According to some, mystical intuition is the realisation of the divine being. However, the mere idea of ‘the recognition of God’ is not sufficient to describe the mystical experience. For ‘regardless of their denomination, the recognition of God is theoretically possible for every believer: it may be accepted that this is rare, difficult, or even exceptional; nevertheless,
exquisite souls are capable of bringing it about”<291.

Delacroix states that mystical intuition is “the product of the unconscious intermingling of common psychological elements; however, unless it is completely lost within the unconscious due to extreme sublimation, it does not transcend the forms and categories presented by the senses”
<30>. Massignon does not share this view. He is among those who acknowledge that the mystical experience is not merely passive knowledge of God. The mystical experience transcends ordinary psychological experience. According to him, the mystical 28. Roger Bastide: 11–12.

29. Ibid., 15.

30. J. Marechal: the work in question, 174. .

THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF INTUITION

The experience is ‘an attempt at asceticism (ascese) through the effort of sympathetic intuition’<3 1>. Whilst we encounter a mystical life among more primitive peoples, the yogis of India, Buddhists, and Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus—and although we find attempts at mystical intuition in all of them—we find the most complete forms of mysticism, and those that have attained perfection in union with God, only in Christianity and Islam. The path (procede) followed by Christian mysticism is as follows: “The ascetic soul enters into communion with God in order to speak with Him, to hear Him and to call Him to itself, and to feel the awareness of possessing Him; this mutual dialogue between the two loves will result in a mutual gift. For God does not suddenly fill the heart; rather, He takes possession of it little by little, in response to the soul’s many acts of self-denial and self-sacrifice. This movement undoubtedly comes from Allah; provided the soul remains obedient to the path that has been opened, Allah allows it to taste the joy of recognition (conscience) by giving it a foretaste of the delights that await it” (32l. The soul that seeks to attain this state purifies itself of sins, loses itself, and abandons worldly associations and the garment of the self. “All of this is called purification. Thus, once the heart has been emptied of its ego, it becomes something belonging to Allah, and the two loves are then united.”
<33l.

Such is Christian mysticism (34l. Its essential characteristics are not artificially created but arise ‘spontaneously’; the mystical endeavour aims not at itself but at union with God, and is characterised by a sense of awe; for ‘its starting point is the sense of God, which is the furnace of love’<35>. This fundamental aim is articulated by the most notable figure among Christian mystics, 3 1. Roger Bastide: the aforementioned work, 2 1.

32. B londel: *Qu’est-ce que la mystique*, 103.

33. Ibid.; continued.

34. Bergson described the path followed by Christian mysticism and the stages it went through in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*: 245–249.

35. Ibid.; 105.

Saint John of the Cross explains as follows: ‘God’s claim is to deify us and, by way of participation, to bestow upon us that which He Himself is in His very essence. God resembles the fire that transforms all things into fire”<361. According to Saint John, within this profound mystical intuition, the knowledge of God and the knowledge of the self are inseparable; they are inextricably linked. “Within this dual and singular knowledge
we find all other forms of knowledge”<37>. In truth, “God alone is the true knower in the fullest sense”<3S>. However, through participation, the soul too can attain God’s absolute wisdom. The soul, too, becomes the possessor of all beings, just as God is. On this matter, let us again heed Saint John’s words:

‘O my soul, from this moment on, can you not love God in His entirety within your heart? The heavens are mine; the earth is mine; the nations are mine; the angels have become mine. The Mother of God and all creatures have become mine. Since Jesus is mine, God Himself has become mine. What else is there left to desire or seek? O my soul, do not all these things belong to you and exist for your sake?’
<39>.

Mystical experience has also undergone the same stages within the Islamic world. Massignon rejected the claims<40) that Islamic mysticism lacks a distinctive character and is merely a copy of Christian and Indian mysticism. Even if it bears the influence of its predecessors, Islamic mysticism is, in essence, “derived from the Qur’an, which is recited by heart,
contemplated through murakabe, and practised”<41). In the Qur’an, the idea of a mystical union between the human soul and the Creator (createur)—36.
Ibid. (Wehrle), 151.

37. Ibid.; 162.

38. Ibid.; 163.

39. Ibid.; 167.

40. Roger Bastide: 43; J. Marechal: 149–151.

4 1. Louis Massignon: The Origins of the Technical Lexicon of Muslim Mysticism: 84.

71

WE FIND THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF ‘INTUITION’<42>. ‘Islamic mystics arose from a profound and experiential reflection on the teachings of the Qur’an at the very heart of Islam. Halac is also among them’<43>.
Islamic mysticism

, we shall give examples from a few of the principal Islamic mystics to demonstrate that he was able to achieve his goal—the attempt at union with Allah, that is, divine intuition—through methods unique to himself: “The starting point of Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi’s philosophy is mukashafah (intuitive insight). The path of reason and contemplation does not lead man to the truth
. Truth is realised only by living it. The path of discovery ensures that man ascends step by step from darkness to light. The light into which all lights converge is none other than the Infinite Being, or Allah.
By disciplining their souls (following a path similar to that of the Sufis), people pass through these stages and acquire lofty spiritual powers beyond the reach of ordinary people. Their hearts become utterly transparent; they gain the ability to penetrate the realm of meaning—both in natural and spiritual

and into the realm of the spiritual, without any intermediary or mediation. In this way, not only the prophets, but every soul that has attained such a divine power comes into contact with the realm of the spiritual; from there, they hear voices and perceive truths. These exceptional individuals attain ‘ishraq’ as a result of a profound spiritual attraction.

‘This ishrak is brought about by the light of Allah’<44>.

In Ibn Tufayl’s novel *Hayy ibn Yaqzan*, we also see that the truth is reached through mystical intuition
truths: Hay, who was raised by a gazelle on an island, is left alone after the gazelle’s death and, by reflecting on events, rises to the concept of God. However, his thought stops there.
He realises that he cannot know God by looking outwards. “To comprehend the light of the Creator and infinite power, looking at the light within himself is sufficient for now… This lived experience reveals to him all that he has seen so far
42. Louis Massignon: *La passion de l’Al-Hallaj*, 498.

43. Ibid., 802.

44. Hilmi Ziya Ülken: The Philosophy of Love, 309–310.

than anything he has witnessed, all the pleasures he has experienced, and all the ideas he has contemplated. In this way, he arrives at the conclusion that true existence can be known not through thought, but only through experience”<45>.

Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali also explain that in religious life, certain knowledge is attained not through reason, but only through intuition.

Ibn Sina recognises two faculties of cognition: external cognition and internal cognition. External cognition takes place through the five senses. Internal cognition is divided into various degrees. Some of these perceive forms, whilst others perceive concepts. Furthermore, some
understand through action, whilst others understand without action (46). Ibn Sina divides the intellect into four levels.

At the highest level lies the acquired intellect (intellectus adeptus).

‘Here, the intellect is entirely turned towards the intelligible and has come into contact with the active intellect. We call this contact “ittisfil”. Our knowledge of all universals derives from this’
<47>. The contact of this acquired intellect—the highest degree of the levels of intellect—with the active intellect unveils the veil of truths to us. “Ibn Sina calls this the ‘sacred power’ (al-quwwatu al-kudsiyya) and refers to this union as ‘ittisal’. Ittisal is no longer a logical process. For here we and perceive things as a unified whole. For this reason, from the point of ittisal onwards, Ibn Sina enters the path of Sufism”<48>.

Al-Ghazali “harbours doubts about the intellect and the faculties of perception, which so often lead us to contradictory judgements, and about the senses, which are deceived. Nor does reason inspire confidence in him.
For its principles do not signify any certainty”<49>. According to him, “in the conflict between reason and faith, there remains a refuge, and that is Sufism. He is convinced that there he will find the true certainty of faith: a singular, definitive, unmediated, intuitive and metaphysical certainty”<45>. Ibid., 325.

46. Ibid., p. 273.

47. Ibid., p. 275.

48. Ibid., p. 279.

49. Ibid., p. 286.

THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF ‘EZGI’

It is knowledge that leads to it. Al-Ghazali states that for a long time he hoped to attain the truth through the path of knowledge, but that these did not satisfy him; eventually, he realised that the truth could be attained through living (the path of experience). “Indeed, to understand what health and satiety are

, one must be healthy and well-fed; and indeed,

one must be drunk. Now I know for certain that the Sufis are people of experience, not people of theory. I had always

in the sciences I have studied, I had always attained faith in religious truths through various proofs. Later, upon examining their states, I saw that they were engrossed in worldly concerns”<s 1 1. Realising this, Ghazali reformed his way of life

and withdrew into seclusion. ‘I remained in seclusion for ten years. During this period, such truths were revealed to me that they are beyond counting… Only the Sufis possess the Path of Allah. They are superior to all judges and scholars. The key to this path lies in the heart’s absorption in the remembrance of Allah and, ultimately, in being completely lost in Allah... The state attained by the Sufis is realised through proofs; to live that state is a delight; and to accept it willingly, with good faith and through experience, is faith.”<s11. The truths obtained are not the work of the intellect. ‘Beyond the intellect there is another faculty, where another eye is opened to perceive the unseen truths of the unseen realm and future events’<53>.

The mystical intuition, which we have sought to describe in various ways, is an intuition pertaining to the
, it produces only a transcendent knowledge appropriate to its own subject.

50. The same work, 29 1.

5 1. The same work, 378–379.

52. Ibid., 380.

53. Ibid., 381.

II. BERGSON’S INTUITIONISM

With the exception of two articles<54>, Bergson has never directly addressed or systematically examined the question of intuition in any of his works. The question of intuition, like others, is one of the issues frequently explained in various

contexts. It was the Bergsonian thinkers, rather than Bergson himself, who provided a fully systematic explanation of intuition. Among those who produced valuable works in this field, Edouard le Roy explained his dialectic, J. Segond his inner lyricism, and J.

Chevalier his idealism, and the mystical aspect which they claimed to exist within Bergsonism.

Intuition, which Bergson presented as the method of metaphysics and which he accepted would provide knowledge of absolute being, differs from all forms of intuition that had been put forward before him. He does not wish to align this method he has set forth with any of the modes of thought known from before; nor does he entertain the idea that there is any resemblance between intuition and any other mode of thought (procede). Nevertheless, the two essays on the interpretation of intuition found in his book *La pensée et le mouvant* (No. 54) are: * * ‘Philosophical Intuition’ and ‘Introduction to
metaphysique’ (Introduction to

Metaphysics). 75

AMONG THOSE WHO DISCUSS BERGSON’S INTUITIONISM, some have claimed that it is the result of an intellectual activity, others that it is a feeling, and still others that it is mystical knowledge.

Baudin seeks the foundations of intuition in the philosopher’s mind, which comes into direct contact with the real
world, in the philosopher’s mind—‘intellectual intuition’ (intuition intellectuelle). According to him, the German Romantics—such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer—had developed their methods, inspired by Platonism, to ensure direct
, drawing inspiration from Platonism. Romantic intuition took the form of metaphysical intuition in Bergson
. The source of all this is Platonic thought<S&>. Penido distinguishes Bergsonism from Plato’s philosophy by the following characteristic: ‘Plato’s dialectic unfolded and dissolved within love. Bergson’s dialectic leads us to joy’<59l. The joy (joie) referred to is the joy of creativity, arising from the
is directed towards life. As Plato was unaware of the constant state of motion in the universe, he was unable to come into direct contact with the entities of this fluid universe.

Despite this difference that sets Bergson apart from him, we see that neither of them sought the clear but untrue knowledge derived from the senses' contact with the external world.

Plato's knowledge arose through vague recollection (reminiscence). Bergson's intuition, too, shuns the sharp, outward-focused lights that reveal nothing beyond the surface: 'This (intuition) is like a lamp that has almost gone out, flickering from time to time for just a few moments. Yet when a vital interest arises, it flares up once more… Concerning our personality, our freedom, the place we occupy within this force of nature
, our origin and perhaps even our destiny, it flickers 55. Leon Brunschvicg.

56. J. Segond.

57. Jacques Chevalier.

58. E. Baudin: Introduction générale à la philosophie, vol. 1, 55.

59. Penido: An Intuitive Method by M. Bergson, 46. 76

BERGSON

and feeble, yet it is surely a light that dispels the darkness

"<6U>. Yet intellect was necessary for the victory of the spirit over material existence<6 J l. One must recognise the role of intellect in intuition.
For the primary aim of intuition is "to attain a complete vision that transcends the universe, all particular systems and all scientific specialisms

. Intuition has an intellectual character from the outset. For Bergson, this vision was not an enlightenment through divine grace or an innate gift. Perhaps it was acquired gradually, a deepening of consciousness"<62l.

From one perspective, intuition resembles intellect and is related to it; from another, it resembles an emotion or spontaneity (spontaneity), and is even regarded by some as possessing a mystical character. Before analysing its specific

structure and its stages, it is necessary to define its distinction from intellect and its relationship with instinct.

Intuition and intelligence

We have seen that the arm of the life-force which reaches out to man splits here into two, one continuing in the direction of intellect, the other in the direction of intuition. Development in the direction of intellect is not the development peculiar to consciousness; perhaps ‘intellect is a consciousness whose form has been distorted as a result of its collision with matter’<6-'>. In its natural state, the primary subject of intellect is
inorganic solid bodies, geometric entities<M>. Intellect is atomistic: it reduces everything to a pre-known state<65>. It disregards all novelty<66>. Every

60. Ev. cr., 290.

6 1. Ev. cr., 290.

62. Em and Rideau: 116.

63. Penido: 85.

64. Ev. cr., 166–167.

65. Parliamentary Proceedings, pp. 177–178.

66. Ev. cr., 177.

BERGSON’S INTUITION places duration within space<67l. It always settles into stillness, as if that were the ultimate reality<6Sl. Because we are born as geometers<69l, we are keen on creating mosaics<70). Yet we feel at ease where there is discontinuity, lifelessness and death:

‘the nature of the intellect, by its very structure, is to fail to comprehend life’<7 I>. The geometric intellect, of course, cannot comprehend continuous motion and life.

Intellect recognises objects in a state of immutability; change is a secondary, contingent state. The object recognised by the intellect is, as it were, a fragment taken from the state of becoming (devenir) and
then substituted by our mind for the whole. Creativity

is the work of time, indeed time itself<72>, and since intellect perception of time, is entirely alien to the idea of creation. The intellect imposes a schema—one that is necessarily divisible within space—upon the sensations it receives; it arranges them geometrically within this schema and names them, ‘forcing upon them the definite and clear divisions and the discontinuity of space
’<73>.

It is therefore incorrect to describe the intellect, which possesses the characteristics of space, as a theoretical faculty. Perhaps it is, in essence, a pragmatic force that safeguards our interests<74>. According to Bergson, the intellect is nothing other than a factory of tools<7s>
<7s>. It thus ensures our adaptation to the external world.

The primary function of intelligence is to form concepts and carry out analyses. A concept never represents reality. It is merely (a suitable 67. Ev. cr., 235.

68. Ev. cr., I 68.

69. Ev. cr., 48.

70. Ev. cr.: 98.

7 1. Ev. cr., 179.

72. Ev. cr., 369.

73. Don. im., VII.

74. Ev. cr., 355.

75. Parliamentary Proceedings, 151.

(symbol)<76l. A translation, a point of view<7Ml, is a shadow of reality (79l) or, essentially, a practical schema (soı). The concept is,

a fragment torn from the whole of reality; a photographic or, rather, a cinematographic view (p. 11).

These definitions of the concept given by Bergson reveal that it distorts and alters reality, substituting an artificial copy for reality itself. Analysis, too, being the process of extracting static elements from dynamic reality, disrupts the composition of reality; it resembles a prism that disperses and dissolves it (82l.

Like the concept, analysis is also very useful for geometry and physics. They too lead to ‘absolute knowledge’ (83l) (84l). However, if you apply it to living beings means you are inevitably entangled in symbols (85). Analysis means breaking something down into a set of pre-known elements. These elements will be found not only in the thing we are analysing but also in other objects. Thus, to analyse is to establish certain relationships between a newly encountered entity and things we already know. Analysis is, in a sense, a form of interpretation. It is the development of an idea through symbols.

Is the entire value of the intellect, whose primary function is to form concepts and carry out analyses, limited to this?

Intuition transfers consciousness from the material world to the realm of life by establishing a sympathetic union between us and other living beings. In this way, the boundaries of the intellect
. ‘However, at the point where it stands—76. Pen. mou. 203, 231.

77. Pen. mou. 204.

78. Pen. mou., 203, 215, 225, 237.

79. Pen. mou., 213.

80. Pen. mou., 224, 226, 229.

8 1. Ev. cr., 359.

82. Penido: 92.

83. Mustafa Şekip Tunç: Translation of ‘Yaratıcı teki’imul’, Xl, footnote IX.

84. Ev. cr., 225, 226, 237, 251.

85. Ev. cr., VII, VIII.

79

"The impulse that brings forth Bergson's intuitionism also stems from intelligence" (lM6). Thus, intelligence is a springboard, a stepping stone used to leap into the realm of becoming{87>. Although intellect and intuition are of a distinct nature and develop in different directions, there was no complete break between the two {8R>. In terms of their subjects, although one is directed towards inanimate matter and the other towards life, one could never exist without the other {19>. Without intellect, intuition would remain
{90>. Intellect is not a faculty that provides relative knowledge. To regard it in this way

would be to diminish its value far more than is warranted. It is merely a faculty of imitative recognition{9J >. It is not a matter of breaking its framework, but of expanding it{92>. Philosophy, whilst seeking to penetrate the whole of reality, will inevitably require the aid of intellect. For alongside the soul
exists alongside matter, and the intellect has derived from matter an incomplete yet absolute form of knowledge, which intuition will subsequently deepen (93). The activity of the intellect accompanies the work of consciousness through intuition in every respect. We observe this activity before, after, or alongside intuition. Maurice Blondel acknowledges that intuition and intellect complement one another's work: 'Intuition does not always precede the intellect, nor does it exclude the intellect—that is, analytical thought; sometimes it follows it and makes up for its shortcomings' (94). Nor is the intellect entirely separate from intuition. "Let us liken intellect to a solid
core formed by an increase in density. This core is surrounded by a shell that

envelops it—86. Ev. cr., 193. 87. Penido: 85.

88. Ev. a, 210.

89. Ev. cr., 129.

9 0. Ev. ct:, 193.

91. Ev. ct:, 216, 387.

92. Ev. cr., Y I.

93. Harald Höffding: La philosophie de Bergson, Bergson's letter, 163.

94. André Lalande: Vocabulaire de la philosophie, vol. 1, 402. 80

BERGSON

"is nothing other than the fluid part"<'J5>. Thus

therefore remains no essential difference between intuition and intellect<%>. Since the intellect reveals itself to us in a clearer form, it will be possible to define intuition in terms of the intellect, and to regard it as a broad movement of the intellect. (Bergson's intuition is, in the broadest sense of the word, an act of intellect) but it is the movement of an intellect that, in order to grasp that which is not its own creation, reverses its natural course and turns in on itself<97>. To gain an intuition of a reality, one must possess experiences of that reality, form judgements about it, and, in a word, extract mental elements from it. Relying on this close connection between intuition and intellect, some seek to reduce it entirely to intellect by completely eliminating the difference in nature between the two attribute it entirely to intellect. Foremost among these is once again the philosopher's admirer, Bünschvicg. According to him, 'intuition is nothing other than the deep activity of the intellect'<'JX).

Bergson does not deny the unique structure of intuition or the fundamental difference between it and intelligence; he merely accepts
. In his view, the philosopher's task is to draw upon not only the luminous centre of his concepts (intellect) but also the fluid layer surrounding this central core (intuition)<99>, to fuse the various forms of reality within the faculty of understanding (entendement)< HX>> and thereby to bring about a more comprehensible reality< ı o ı ı, and in this way to attain a knowledge that embraces life in an ever more complete
form that embraces life< Hızı>.

95. Ev. cr., 210–211.

96. Ev. cr., 193.

97. Félicien Challaye: Bergum, 47.

98. Léon Brunschvicg: *L’orientation du rationnel*, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* (1920), 226.

99. Ev. cr., 50.

100. Ev. cr., V-53, 54.

101. Ev. cr., 56, 57, 58.

102. Ev. cr., V.

BERGSON’S INTUITIONISM: Instinct and Intuition

Bergson argues that intuition, which he essentially distinguishes from intelligence, arises from instinct. Pascal, Hartmann, Schelling and Nietzsche had also spoken of instinct<Hm. Before coming into being, instinct and intellect co-existed in the realm of life. These arose from the division of the life impulse as it advanced, splitting into two and developing in separate directions
. The difference between them is not merely one of intensity or degree

but perhaps a difference in nature< Hl4>. Instinct is a faculty bestowed by nature to enable the living being to adapt to its environment in the best possible way and to ensure that it benefits from that environment. To achieve this aim, it, like intelligence, is tool-making. However, its tool-making ability is entirely different from that of intelligence: ‘a fully developed instinct is the faculty of utilising and creating specialised tools’< ı os>. The knowledge provided to us by the two is of entirely different kinds< Hl6>. The skill that instinct can attain in a single stroke appears, to the intellect, as an advanced ability acquired through long labour: “The way a parasitic Hymenopteran stings its prey—paralysing it without killing it, precisely at the nerve

centres, resembles the joint work of an entomologist and a skilled surgeon"< J07>. "If it is accepted that both intellect and instinct contain innate (inné) knowledge, it becomes apparent that this innate knowledge pertains to entities in the case of instinct, and to relationships in the case of intellect"< i OR>. Intellect provides knowledge of form, whilst instinct provides knowledge of matter< Jo<J>. (However, what the intellect can investigate, but not of its own accord—1 03. Penido: 37. footnote.

1 04. Ev. cr., ı 47.

105. Ev. cr., p. 152.

106. Ev. cr., p. 155.

107. Ev. cr., p. 158.

108. Ev. a, ı 6 1.

109. Ev. cr., cont.

(The instinct can discover things that reason will never find, yet it, too, will never seek them) O IO>. Thus, the state in which the investigations of reason begin will be reached through the instinct. The instinct is not merely an ordinary reflex, just as it is of a different nature from the intellect.

It is sympathy (O I I). 'If this sympathy were to broaden its scope and reflect upon itself, it could provide us with the key to the events of life' (O I 2>. However, as long as instinct remains instinct, it is bound to nothing other than the concern for the preservation and development of the life to which it is attached. Its severing of ties with its vital interests, its becoming aware of itself, has given rise to intuition. Given that it arises from instinct, intuition must be defined as follows: 'it is the instinct that has freed itself from the bonds of self-interest, become self-aware, and acquired the capacity to reflect upon its subject and to expand this subject boundlessly and without limit'< 1 1 3).

The Stages of Intuition

Intuition, which is essentially distinct from intelligence due to its unique structure and which arises from the development of instinct, what stages does it undergo in consciousness? We have seen that it makes use of concepts at its inception and at every stage of its development. We shall also see that concepts derived from objects continuously give rise to
, and that the dynamic forms arising through these images lead consciousness towards creativity. Finally, it must be acknowledged that effort is essential for intuition to be complete and for the work of creation to come into being. Let us now examine these three stages in the movement of the intuitive mind in turn. In this way, the path (procede) followed by the intuitive mind (pensee intuitive) will be recognised.

1 1 0. Ev. cr., 1 64.

l l l . Mustafa Şekip Tunç: Translation of *The Creative Principle*, XLVI–XLVII, footnotes.

1 1 2. Ev. cr., 1 9 1 .

1 1 3. Ev. cr., 1 92.

BERGSON'S INTUITIONISM 1. Concepts

It cannot be said that ideas are useless in intuition. On the contrary, they
. For the structure of the human mind consists entirely of an endeavour to reduce the new to what is already known. What we already know exists within us in the form of concepts. Our knowledge is constituted by the totality of these known elements. Intuition can only derive the speed of its ascent from this foundation provided by knowledge. In this respect, it is said to rest on an intellectualist foundation. Indeed, according to Bergson,
it is not a question of disregarding the findings of science in intuition and plunging into the darkness of certain fictitious realms of 'illumination'. Intuition can only be attained through extensive research and highly complex and laborious analyses (1141). Indeed, all the technical and creative endeavours of the mind serve to prepare the ground for intuition. 'Bergson always likened intuition to the shuttle's dance.

In it, the principles of intellect, art and morality prepare, to the utmost degree, for the emergence of this seductive movement—which may or may not come—carried along by the winds of inspiration' (1151).

As a consequence of all these ideas, one must accept the following: Intuition was not a thought process without a beginning; it is not an absolute beginning, but perhaps the end and purpose of a system of thought. 'The unprecedented discoveries that arise at the very moment when the mind appears most absent-minded are, if not always, then at least for the most part, the highest point reached by a long, previously exerted effort—a tireless and unceasing, obstinate line of thought that repeatedly takes up the same ideas' (111, 61). However, intuition must be fundamentally distinguished from the thought of the world. Science stands between things and us. 1 1 4. Penido: 47–48.

ı ı 5. André Landé: Critical Account of (Jean-Jacques Gourd) by L. Trial, Revue philosophique, year (1923), 46 116.

Albert Spaier: Une pensée concrète, 27.

is drawing a veil. We are endeavouring to discover the reality beyond this veil. And we pour our thought into the capacity of that reality. The role of concepts, which form the starting point of metaphysics, ends here. Concepts can only allow us to contemplate reality from the outside; they cannot take us inside it. It is dynamic imagination that pierces the shell of reality and penetrates into it.

2. Imagination (image)

In Bergson's works, we see that images and metaphors are used extensively. This has led to Bergsonism being accused of aestheticism. However, the intellectual appeal of his work is such that it overshadows this shortcoming. We might say, 'No philosopher since Plato has written as marvellously as he has.'< J J 7J

To regard these images as mere ornament is to fail to understand Bergson. Bergson was compelled to rely on the imagination due to the inadequacy of reason

. The mind, laden with metaphors, serves as the stage for the clash of these visions. The most powerful of these take hold and constitute our ‘internal duration’ (durée interne). Like a ball of yarn

, they are constantly unfolding and always appear in multiplicity. Where do these constantly changing and ever-increasing visions originate? The source of these visions lies in a set of dynamic schemata. A dynamic schema is a simple conception capable of unfolding into the visions it contains latently and in potential. A dynamic schema is, in itself,
simple. It is virtually impossible to define it. However, it can be conveyed by analogy. It is a kind of rhythm of consciousness. This rhythm is known only to the consciousness that experiences it. Yet, through suggestion, it can be
. Novelists are well aware of this suggestive power of imagination. They know that
1 1 7. Ibid., 50.

1 1 8. Ibid., 5 1.

BERGSON’S INTUITIONISM: we usually live within the shell of our
soul: this is an impersonal realm where simplifying logic reigns
impersonal realm where simplistic logic reigns supreme. And their skill lies in ‘piercing the skilfully
woven veil of our self, revealing that beneath this apparent logic lies a profound meaninglessness, and that beneath this accumulation of simple states lies the endless intermingling of thousands of visions of every kind’. When we read such a work
, we appreciate the novel ‘because it knows even those aspects of ourselves that we recognise better than we do’. ‘Drawing courage from it, we lift the veil stretched between our own selves. It confronts us with ourselves” (O J 9). These fantasies, which surge at the boundaries of intuition, are extraordinarily difficult to conceive, let alone describe. They do not remain fixed before the eyes of consciousness
. They reveal the fluidity within us and are constantly changing. They cannot be described in clear terms. When we wish to express them, we use symbols.

Our language is capable of expressing only formed states and ideas; it contains a set of fixed patterns devised for their expression. We have no direct means of expression for direction and movement. This is why philosophers and artists resort to metaphors and similes in their expressions.

These indescribable visions, constantly generated by the dynamic schema and which also heighten consciousness, are ‘substances that can only be perceived’. Yet they have now
they have become too spiritual to be touched. They are very delicate entities. Moreover, this is an extraordinarily vital thing. If a definition is absolutely required, one must say that there is a state of

in these visions. Bergson states that imagination is achieved by cramming in as many things as possible”
<1 10>.

Imagination is but a shadow of intuition; it is not intuition itself. 19. Don. im., 101.

1 20. Penido: 55.

B. Bergson

. Intuition proceeds from imagination; yet it is something other than imagination; and ‘no imagination whatsoever can fully express the original sensation of that fluidity within me’ 1 1 1. Attaining intuition will be possible through the exertion (effort) directed towards the ultimate goal.

3. Striving or effort

Intuition is the direct (immediate) knowledge of a reality. What we call ‘immediate’ is a primary and elementary, pure and unadulterated datum (donné). This concept has been defined by the Scottish School’s empirical view

as that which is perceived at a glance by a thinking eye, or attained in a single stroke. The word ‘immediate’ also has a metaphysical meaning. In this sense, it is no longer a progression between two stages—the beginning and the conclusion of an inquiry—

. In this sense, it is not an incidental but a fundamental point of departure; it is, in the fullest sense, the true source and depth.
The Cartesians' 'cogito' is an example of this kind of 'immediat'. However, the concept of 'immediat' as articulated by Bergson's intuition must be given a meaning distinct from both of these. In this sense, it is 'a distant goal of a retrospective, that is, a critical journey; it is the product of a great endeavour, yet at times it is the artist's intuition that seizes it in a single stroke. Very often, the 'immediat' is far from being grasped in such a single stroke. In the investigation of the 'immediat', one cannot dispense with reason; what is at stake here is not a mysterious illumination, but a method in the full sense of the word; not an ideology, but experience"< 1 111. We can recognise the existence of the 'immediat' by the following characteristics: a) It remains independent of all kinds of symbols and expressions; amidst the changes in every theoretical or practical movement, it never changes; b) It dominates every system, that is, it manifests itself in the various stages of every thought;

121. Pen. mou., 213.

122. Edouard Le Roy: La pensée intuitive, 133. 87

BERGSON'S INTUITIVISM c) No criticism can undermine or eliminate it; it never takes refuge in a fixed and specific form of expression, and thus its content is inexhaustible; whilst it can be understood in infinite and varied forms

, yet, like a unifying spring from which streams flow, it unites these diverse understandings within a constant simplicity< 1 2J>.

Attaining the 'immediacy' that consists of intuition requires profound effort. When speaking of intuition, Bergson most frequently uses the word 'effort'. The most striking aspect of intuition is its essentially active, almost intense character.

Intuition is, at first, a fleeting, incomplete light—almost like the glow of a dim lamp—that flickers briefly and then fades away. But then it suddenly fills us with light< l 24>. For this reason, we do not usually perceive
. Instead, we encounter certain states of being: these

these forms of experience, which have no subject matter, are intuitions. Discoveries, which are undoubtedly the fruit of great endeavours, reveal themselves at certain moments as an inner impulse. To this effect, Spaier states, ‘intuition is a vague thought’ (0 25). It is the result of a long and arduous preparation taking place in the subconscious, rising to the level of consciousness. Intuition is something far beyond an ordinary perception. It resembles a surge or a movement, perhaps a whirlwind, or a creative contact.

Can such a contact provide absolute knowledge? Absolute knowledge is that which enters into things through the power of the imagination and dwells within them (0 26). For this reason, intuition is called ‘knowledge from within’. It is an effort, a straining of the self, expended in order to penetrate entities and thereby reach absolute being. In this respect, 123. Ibid., continued.

p. 24. Ev. cr., p. 39.

ı 25. Albert Spaier: La pensée concrète, 262. ı 26.

Ev. cr., 228.

BERGSON

Intuition resembles life. Like life, it is a constant struggle, a perpetual exertion of effort< 1 27>. Intuition goes against the habits of the intellect

. But how is it possible to oppose the intellect through the very process of thought? Bergson illustrates this with an example: ‘If you have never seen a man swim, you might tell me that swimming is impossible. For to swim, one must first be able to stay afloat. And to do that, one must already know how to swim. Yet you learn to swim without knowing how to swim. How does this happen?
I jump into the water without fear. And I try, as best I can, to stay afloat. At first I flail about, then little by little I learn to adapt to this new environment, and I swim.”< ı ıxı. The ability to swim was already within us. But we did not know beforehand that it existed within us. In the end, through arduous effort,

, the ability emerged as if it were something new. The emergence of intuition is much the same. Within the images the mind has imprisoned within itself, intuition—which will become its creation—lies as if hidden. When all the obstacles that imprison it and hide it from our eyes—the habits of the intellect and its rigid forms—are swept away by the powerful impulse of the inner drive we have spoken of, intuition emerges as a state of creativity. This creativity of intuition must not be understood merely in terms of the manner in which original compositions come into being. Metaphysical intuition, although it can be attained through knowledge of matter, is
. It is of a different nature from the synthesis of this knowledge, just as the force of motion is distinct from the path traced by the moving object, or the tension in a clock's mainspring is distinct from the movements observed in the clock (J 29).

The first harbinger of this creativity in our consciousness, its unfailing herald, is an infinite, causeless and, as it were, purposeless joy (Uoie). This joy, which is not bound to any practical purpose, is a kind of inner longing within us—127. Ev. cr., 290.

1 28. Ev. cr., 210.

1 29. Pen. m oıı., 255

 also gives rise to the satisfaction of enlightenment. This joy is distinct from ordinary pleasure (plaisir). Pleasure is a tool used by nature to preserve the individual's life and propagate it. It does not inform us about the course of life. True joy, on the other hand, is always a sign of life's triumph. Not pleasure, but joy—that fierce and intoxicating joy which is the sublime reward for the fruits of thought.

Where there is joy, there is creativity. The richer the creativity, the deeper the joy. For it is a sign of life's triumph. 'The joy of creation surpasses all other joys. Just as in the spiritual realm,
, a mother who cradles her child—the fruit of her creativity—in her arms speaks in the same way.

After enduring the hardships of a difficult birth, the craftsman who sees his creation—capable of life—rising before his very eyes also

and feels it in this way; he, too, experiences the joy of having created something that walks. The highest form of this joy belongs to the scholar, the artist and the philosopher; undoubtedly, these men are not incapable of attaining the caresses of victory; yet if the scholar, the artist and the philosopher were to chase after fame, this must be regarded as a sign that they do not possess
. Give them this assurance, and you will immediately see that they are scarcely attached to the clamour surrounding their own names" (I 301.

The intuition of the external world

Intuition is, above all, the knowledge of inner reality. What it grasps directly are the data of consciousness. Bergson applied such a method of inward-turned intuition to the investigations in his book *The Data Directly Given by Consciousness*. In this way, he demonstrated the existence within us of pure duration (durée pure) and freedom (liberté), showing that they are truths to be lived rather than merely understood—

30. From Bergson's lectures at the Collège de France, 19 May 1911. 90

BERGSON

. However, intuition is not directed solely inwards; it is also directed outwards towards the external world. Yet, whilst direct contact with our inner selves is more or less possible under the conditions described, we encounter a serious obstacle between ourselves and the reality outside us, one that conceals its true structure from us: this obstacle is inanimate matter.
The external world's...

We know that the structure of reality is the constant becoming of life, which is aR-ı

. Materiality is not its essential structure. Yet we encounter matter everywhere. And we can never comprehend this continuous becoming from the outside, that is, with the aid of the intellect.

To break through the rigid shell of existence, which consists of inanimate matter, and to grasp its true structure—which is pure life and pure duration—and to penetrate it, one must step beyond the intellect and be able to experience the state of becoming of things. However,
first of all, by stepping outside the realm of reason, I will have grasped my own personal becoming; the intuition of the self will arise. In this way, the intuition of things will not have been attained, and philosophy will remain merely psychology. Therefore, to grasp a state of life—which is external reality—it is not enough simply to step outside the realm of reason; at the same
we must also step completely outside ourselves and situate ourselves within reality as the product of a movement that unites subject and object<1 3 1 >. But is the possibility of such knowledge not merely a fantasy? I can only exist together with my own self; I cannot separate myself from myself. Bergson responds forcefully to this objection: there are two kinds of knowledge. One is static knowledge, in which the knower and the known are separate from one another. The other is dynamic knowledge—which is also called intuition proper—in which the movement of knowledge merges with the generative movement of reality<1 32>. It is this kind of dynamic knowledge that provides us with an intuition of the external world. Bergson arrives at the idea of ‘creative evolution’—the central theme of his greatest work—through such dynamic intuition 1 3 1. Mat. mem., 247.

1 32. *Don. im.*, 1 44–1 45.

9 1

BERGSON’S INTUITIONISM. How does dynamic knowledge ensure our union with reality and thus our recognition of the truth outside ourselves?

To achieve this, we must first transform our concrete perceptions into ‘pure perceptions’, and then, through a mental sympathy, unite with reality. Thus, the intuition of external entities occurs in two stages.

1. Pure perception

Our perceptions are concrete; they are mixed with many elements of reality and are not pure. First and foremost, they are imbued with the affections of my body. According to Bergson, my perceptions arise as follows: my consciousness selects from among the images of the external world those that are suited to its practical purpose. Around these selected images, my

form a circle that deepens into the past
. My consciousness presents these memories, selected by my memory at this very moment, as the whole of reality. Yet this is merely the appearance of the images that concern it. These images, previously selected by my consciousness, subsequently exert a reciprocal influence upon it, and I perceive the entirety of my memories—which consist of the past—within this interplay of influences. In other words, these externally selected images, which were previously shaped by my memories, in turn shape my memories and imbue them with their own hues—that is, their emotional states (affections)
to my memories. It is then that the images I receive from the outside give rise to states of affect (affect) within my body, which I can conceive of as an independent image situated at the centre amongst them. However, in this way, both the manner in which the spatial (erendu) dreams I receive from the outside become non-spatial (inhendu) sensations within my body , and the original impulses of these sensations I recognise within my body

. In this way, the objects outside me, like light projected by a light source onto a screen, are reflected back onto the external objects; and these sensations, having become affective (affectij) within my body, when they return to the images that sent them, illuminate their surroundings and give rise to a full and clear consciousness of the objects within me.

Thus, my body functions as a transmitting centre amidst the external ideas that surround it, returning to them the sensations it receives from them. However, the sensations that come to my body as extended (étendu) from the external ideas become non-extended (inétendu) affective states (affecti) within my body. Yet the living body is not a mathematical point in space; like other perceptions, it is a perception with extension (étendu) and a perception distinct from them. It follows, then, that the body’s role is to receive stimuli from entities in order to produce reactions to the external world. Why is this response not haphazard? Because this response makes its selection from the experiences of the past and constantly summons the memories that similar states have accumulated behind them. For this reason, it can be said that without possessing a perspective rooted in the past, we

. The fact that our activity constantly propels us forward leaves a void in its wake; memories fill this void, and thus memory brings about a sort of ‘repercussion’ within the realm of knowledge.

How is ‘pure perception’ derived from these concrete perceptions? Here, the philosopher has two tasks: firstly, to strip it away from the individual’s memories—which surround it and render it entirely subjective—and secondly, to separate it from the veil of self-interest that conceals it from us. By imparting continuity (dım!e) to our concrete perceptions ( ), the subjectivity of the characteristics obtained by the senses—1 33. Math. Mem., summary of the first chapter.

93

It is our memory that constitutes Bergson’s ‘intuitionism’.
In order to derive an impersonal and ideal perception from our concrete perceptions, it is necessary to purge the concrete perception of all incidental elements pertaining to the individual, and of the things attached to it by memories. Duration,
being an event attached to our person, to our self, and to the individual’s spiritual existence, once duration ceases to exist in pure perception, memory too will have been entirely eliminated. In truth, it will become apparent that there is not a difference of degree, but a difference of nature, between concrete perception—which consists entirely of memory—and pure perception, which has been purified of all traces of memory<B4>.

It will become clear that there is a fundamental difference between them, just as there is a difference in nature between matter and spirit.

2. Empathy

Pure perception brings us into contact with the absolute existence of matter. However, to grasp the duration that exists outside us, we must take a further step. Bergson states that, for this, it is necessary to call upon a different kind of knowledge and to bring into play the intuition of another realm. He calls this ‘divinatory sympathy’ (sympathie divinatrice) 0 35>. According to him, ‘behind what is seen lies what is discovered’ < J 36>. That which we ‘feel to exist within ourselves, but whose existence outside ourselves we discover through sympathy, is duration.

‘It is impossible for us to express it in the language of the intellect’ 0 37>. Vital intuition is precisely this mental sympathy. Thanks to it,

“one reaches into the very being of a thing in order to unite with that which is unique and inexpressible within it” 0 38), as Bergson had stated. According to him, in order to grasp a thing beyond any form of translation or symbolic expression

, one must live it rather than think it; one must be one with that thing 134. Math. Mem., 60.

35. Ev. cr., 191.

36. *Ev. cr.*, 144.

37. *Ev. cr.*, 178, 191, 228, 370.

38. Pen. mou., 205.

Sympathy must be established between us< I 39>. The sympathy referred to here is the fusion of two kinds of intuition:

The intuition of the external and the intuition of the internal complement one another. The fusion between consciousness and objects is not something like consciousness being added to objects in a contingent manner.
The truth is that consciousness first turns inwards, then emerges outwards, relaxing, expanding and preparing to move through space; the mind’s entry into and settlement within matter brings about, little by little, a sort of materialisation
, and this fusion gives rise to the first light within us. This first light, which marks the beginning of intuition, ensures that we find our bearings amidst the boundless and incalculable events that psychology presents to us.

Thus, consciousness is not superimposed on matter from the outside.

Perhaps, at the outset, consciousness moves towards matter and appears to become materialised. Once a rapprochement between the two has been established, the objects—which are a mass of illusions—merge within consciousness and take on its character

It gives rise to intuition. This implies that the immanence of consciousness within matter is accepted here. Of course it must be so; ‘consciousness is not, after all, something that has curled up and remained in a corner of the universe like a repentant child. No! The matter and life that fill the world are also within us; we feel within ourselves the forces at work everywhere; whatever the essence of things that exist and are coming into being may be, we too are made of it. Let us therefore delve into our own inner selves: however deep the point we touch there may be, the impulse propelling us back
back to the surface will be all the stronger. Philosophical intuition is precisely this contact; this impulse is philosophy”< I40).

1 39. Pen. mou., 206.

1 40. Pen. mou., 1 57.

III. CRITICISMS OF BERGSON’S

INTUITIONISM

Although there are those who claim that Bergsonism—which has drawn profound insights, so to speak, from the systems of many philosophers from ancient Greece to the present day, as well as from modern sciences
, there are those who claim that Bergsonism is a work of eclecticism; nevertheless, one must acknowledge the strong individual character of this philosophy, which has consistently produced original syntheses. Indeed, Bergsonism is a joint work of science and art, having succeeded in
structure, and is a joint work of science and art. It should not be forgotten that, in proportion to the multitude of thinkers with whom Bergsonism has engaged, there is also a multitude of issues it has addressed in order to reach its conclusions. Perhaps one might say that a reason for the universal fame of this philosopher—who has touched upon almost all the fundamental issues of philosophy

and reached conclusions on all of them, lies in the breadth of the fields he has opened up in the world of ideas and the vastness of his horizons.

Another reason for this fame taking hold so rapidly everywhere is, no doubt, his style—rich in imagery and metaphor, his splendour, his skilful nature that proceeds from the findings of positive science

and skilfully settling on the mysteries of the universe, and his displays of creativity that do not leave his explanations with a simple and logical certainty—qualities peculiar to an artist. For this reason, the objections raised against Bergson 96

are not few that touch upon his penchant for ‘artistry’ (esthérisme).

It is the method that defines Bergson’s system. It is impossible to separate this method from the philosopher’s system. Consequently, criticisms directed at intuition—which is a method in its own right—are to be regarded as directed directly at Bergson’s
system. And a great many of the criticisms levelled against Bergsonism concern the very nature of the method. We shall attempt to list some of these criticisms around the fundamental issues of intuitionism.

The value of intuition

According to Höffding, Bergson “has not provided a fully clear definition of intuition”

nor has he “determined its philosophical value”< l 4 l l. Bergson, who always shuns the use of concepts, resorts to terms that are inherently incompatible when defining intuition: the term “mental sympathy” is one such example. A definition using words that express intellect on the one hand and emotions on the other cannot dispel the ambiguity. The words “existence” and “expression
" are also of this nature. What is there in existence itself that cannot be expressed to us? For us, a thing is the sum of a set of qualities. We can always express these qualities by means of analogy. What is difficult to express—perhaps because of its complexity—is the drama unfolding within our inner life
. Because it cannot be expressed very clearly through intuition, each of those most closely connected to it has explained the nature of intuition in different
ways. The modern Catholicisation in Edouard Le Roy’s thought, the est/ıetisme of Joussain and Rageot, and Chevalier’s religious spiritualisme< I 4J>—all emerged in the light of the same intuition, yet are so different 1 4 1. Harald Höffding: La philosophie de l’existence, 63.

1 42. Pen. nıou., 205.

1 43. Penido: 1 22–1 23.

styles of thought. It would be appropriate to add J. Segond's subtle and somewhat mystical psychology' to these systems. This latter thinker,
attributes the obscure and ambiguous nature of Bergson's intuition

in the fact that we have imposed a judgement upon it from the outside. He maintains that if one were to enter into its reality directly, the ambiguity would vanish

and the darkness would immediately disperse is a response, often repeated by Bergson's his followers, is a response that is by no means convincing. According to Bergson, another reason for the obscurity in the darkness is that intuition does not consist of a single movement. He states that intuition is 'an infinite series of movements, all undoubtedly of the same kind, yet each of a very specific nature' (l l 44).

Essentially, he is convinced that there are no simple (elementary) states in consciousness. Such states, set apart from the others, are the result of analysis. Those who analyse consciousness artificially distinguish such states within it. However, there are no such simple states in consciousness. Consciousness is a process; states of consciousness are continuous and ever-changing. More precisely, it is impossible to distinguish many states within consciousness. The fundamental reality is that the attempt to obtain distinct, separate acts of consciousness is like tearing apart a fabric that does not exist. B audin vehemently rejects this objection, which is characteristic of Bergsonism

vehemently rejects this objection. In his view, there is nothing more fabricated than this idea of division. 'There is no need whatsoever to divide or create events; the task at hand is simply to describe them as they appear to us. To distinguish what is already naturally distinct is not an artificial act; the perception of events within us is as pure and simple as the perception of external events. The analysis here is not like analysis in the material sense; it consists merely of attention to that which draws us in and holds us fast"ll 45>.

By not distinguishing the individuality of states of consciousness, we approach consciousness as a whole, and intuition, within which particular states are distinct—1 44. Pen. nwu., 233.

1 45. E. Baudinet: Cours de psychologie, 1 4.

In fact, J. Segond, one of the Bergsonians, explained and understood intuition as the turning of intense introspection—which he termed the ‘fundamental feeling’ (le sentiment fondamental)—towards the manifestation of the history of individual consciousness within the synesthetic moment.

Claims that Bergson’s intuition is nothing other than such a feeling or the feeling of life itself , in the eyes of Bergson’s opponents, remove intuition from being a mental element. ‘Intuitions are merely states of personal or sympathetic consciousness. When these states are examined, the fluidity linked to the senses, ceaseless movement, and life’s vague, kinesthetic sense of its own passing—dissolve into scratchy sensations evoked by a sea of stimuli from the material environment” <J 461.

Bergson vehemently objects to the notion that intuition should be understood as an emotion: “Not a single line in our writings , and throughout our writings the opposite has been maintained: our intuition is thought (reflexion)” <J 47>.

However, Bergson’s intuition, as revealed by his own explanations regarding the intuition of the external world, is shown to be entirely , as demonstrated by his own explanations regarding the intuition of the external world. Indeed, the definition of intuition that we have repeated above< l 48l—as the ‘means of possessing a reality in an absolute sense’< J 49), and the notion that doing philosophy means ‘settling within things through the effort of intuition’, all express the idea of living in harmony with things.

We know that pure perception placed consciousness within things. The self—

46. Alfred Fouilh!e: Thought and the New Anti-Intellectualist Schools, 387.

1 47. Pen. mou., 109. I

48. Pen. mou., 205. 1

49. Pen. mou., 206.

I 50. Pen. mou., 226.

The intuition obtained by the 'inner' itself is also a recognition from within. It follows, then, that the intuition of the 'inner' and the intuition of the external world are obtained by the same means··

. For consciousness, to be situated within beings means, in truth, that beings acquire characteristics belonging to consciousness; it means that the material (materiel) takes on a spiritual (spirituel) form. Does the danger of recognising things through states of consciousness—that is, 'psychologisme'—not lead Bergson, in the full to 'mysticism'? The fact that the distinction between consciousness and things is entirely

reveals a complete resemblance to mystical 'monism'. Indeed, the idea that consciousness can dwell within objects

is thought-provoking. Fouillee raises the following objection on this point: 'We grasp what passes within ourselves directly, because we are entirely enclosed within ourselves; but how are we to penetrate another? In reality, I cannot dwell within another being; I cannot merge with it, nor can I merge with that which is unique, inexpressible and, consequently, incommunicable within it, for otherwise that unique thing would cease to exist: I would become its equal, its dual existence; indeed, something even more impossible—I would become that thing itself."

Paliard argues that defining intuition as the identity of subject and object would amount to a denial of thought. According to him, intuition 'cannot mean such a preposterous identity, or rather, such an absence of consciousness' 052l. This idea of the identity of subject and object, when taken to its logical extreme, led some to attach practical importance to Schelling's 'intellectual intuition'

. Did it not seek to unite the ‘self’ (moi) with the ‘other-than-self’ (mon-moi) in a mysterious identity
? In this respect, Bergsonism appears to be a form of Schelling’s system extended to its very limits.

1 5 ı . A. Fouillee: 349.

152. J. Paliard: Intuition and Reflection, 443.

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Although this intuition, which is so vague, does not belong to our inner world, some have attached practical importance to it, even though it may be considered questionable as to whether it presents the reality outside us as it truly is. They have suggested that it could serve as a method of action in practical life< J 53l.

Höffding identifies in Bergson’s intuition the principle of analogy, which he once recognised as the foundation upon which Leibniz’s entire metaphysics was based< J

54>. Analogies can lead to new discoveries, but they cannot prove anything< 1 ss1.

Lacombe is of the opinion that Bergson's intuition possesses no original character: 'The reason why intuition plays such an important role in Bergson's thought and appears to be the foundation of a philosophy whose novelty is undeniable must be sought not in the nature of intuition itself, but in the nature of the subjects to which it is applied: It is not the meaning of intuition as presented by this philosophy that determines its use and importance. It is the claims (theses) that constitute Bergson's philosophy. Since the direct data of consciousness reveal a psychological life entirely distinct from the flaws we have acquired through reason, the intuition that enables us to recognise them appears to proceed in the opposite direction to reason. Pure perception brings us into
, so in this realm, intuition is meta-1 53. Alain, who in philosophy is closely associated with reason and scepticism, values intuition in practical life. 'In practical life, thought gives rise to hesitation; there are moments when we cannot even draw upon our past experiences.

For this reason, it is not a bad thing to accept, without further deliberation, a person or thing that immediately appeals to us or seems suitable. This gives us a sense of confidence. What justifies intuition is the immediate and unchanging decision we make. 'The main benefit I see here is that we place our trust in our own selves; this protects us from indecision; for we must realise that there is no remedy for indecision. Whether we engage in reasoning or seek parallels in experience, this process has no end; doubt will not leave us." Alain: Minerve ou de la sagesse, 47.

1 54. Harald Höffding, La philosophie de Bergson, 1 35.

1 55. Ibid., 1 37.

gains a physical dimension. Since life is a creative impulse of the same nature as the spiritual impulse, only intuition can lead us to life. Ultimately, the deep reality—which is the reality of matter to a
extent the reality of matter, is neither an illusion nor

cannot be fully rendered through imagination; therefore, intuition is not a conception dependent on imagination, but perhaps a form of thought of a different nature; it is pure thought that rejects all forms of externalisation" (056). The concept of Duration

Bergson states in many places in his work that Kant's concept of time does not possess the meaning of real time. "What Kant accepts as time is a time that does not flow, does not change and has no duration" (057). Whereas, in Kant, time—as the a priori form of inner sensation—was applied to
. And, by the very nature of these events, it was a real time possessing flow and duration.

Bergson presented a duration that fully possessed these characteristics as a form of real reality. However, according to him, there had to be not just one, but various durations: the duration of life, the duration of matter as it is just beginning, a duration that is almost mechanised, and finally, divine duration. Which of these durations would be the object of intuition?

Although Bergson spoke of duration in all fields, he left it unspecified as to which one intuition pertains to (l 5ll>. However, when speaking of intuition, he characterises it as 'real duration' (durée réelle).
This lived and concrete duration, the 'fabric' (tissu) of our spiritual essence, is far from being adequately expressed by this concept.

The expression of all shared and impersonal ideas within social relationships—156. Roger Lacombe: La psychologie bergsonienne, 308–309.

1 57. Pen. mou., 1 78.

1 5 8. Penido: ı 1 6.

beyond the discontinuities associated with it, it is possible to directly experience the freshness of the actual flow.

The progression of consciousness within the pure duration—which it has itself carved out of reality, and of which it is itself composed—free from concepts, symbols and all forms of conceptualised imagination, and finally its union with the life of things,
by settling within it; this sympathetic fusion, which renders the separate conceptions of subject and object impossible: this is precisely how intuition comes into being
We can express this as such a splendid and ideal ‘proc(!de’. It is impossible not to view with scepticism the claim that the words used to describe the stages of this path (procede) can truly capture reality. ‘Perhaps Bergson has here succumbed to a verbal lyricism (/yrisme verbal) and to the erroneous

judgement that primordial reality is true reality... The intuition of duration will numb the mind in the stark darkness of the depths, diverting it towards torpor or a dream-like
, and under the pretext of poetry and freshness, drag it into a state of passivity, a morbid indifference towards daily life, and a state of dissatisfaction with movement’0 59J.

Instinct and Intelligence

Bergson had stated that intuition is an instinct purified by being detached from vital interests! 1 6n>. We know that instinct is most deeply bound up with our vital interests, and that it is directed towards life with the aim of adapting the living being to its environment. How, then, does the development of such an instinct give rise to intuition, which has absolutely no connection with vital interests? Bergson,
that intuition transforms the mind’s unique fabric (tissu), which is woven from interests, and diverts it from the pursuit of self-interest. 1 59. Emile Rideau: 1 1
8–119.

1 60. Ev. cr. . 1 92.

he accepted that it was transformed into absolute truth. Here, the fact that the soul deviates from its natural course, as if by a miracle, was a

. The same concern and doubt can be repeated regarding the instinct underlying intuition: “Is it not strange to attribute to instinct—which, whilst the existence of such a capacity in the intellect is denied, is in the organic realm firmly bound to the vital necessities that surround it on all sides—the ability to reach even absolute truth
and the privilege of spreading as intuition unrelated to self-interest?” 0 6 1 l. In this regard, it is also necessary to point out
.

Whilst at one point in his work (0 62l) he explicitly states that ‘intuition’ is ‘an instinct stripped of self-interest’, elsewhere (0 63l),

he does not hesitate to say that “intuition is neither an instinct nor a feeling”, and adds: ‘Nowhere in our writings can a single line be found that could be interpreted in this way. Throughout our writings, we have maintained the opposite: our intuition is thought.’

Bergson suggests that instinct dwells in the darkness of the unconscious (inconscient), and that intuition, which emerges with its development, pushes against the boundaries of the unconscious. In this way, he attaches importance to the existence of the unconscious—which he set out in *Matter and Spirit*—in the emergence of intuition. However, the concept of the unconscious, long accepted by some, has always been subject to objections. According to Alain, consciousness exists as a whole. To conceive of it as comprising regions of light, semi-light and darkness is nothing more than a play on words. ‘The basis for this inner mythology lies in the fact that memories appear to emerge from a kind of darkness and then return to it. Yet what remains and returns is always an action, such as memorisation. Take a close look at this: Domecq: Leçon de philosophie, vol. 11, p. 499.

No. 62. Ev. cr., No. 192.

63. Pen. mou., 109.

64. Pen. mou., 36.

‘It is commonly assumed that memories are, in ordinary circumstances, a sort of thought lying behind us and emerging at another moment’< 165>. Alain states that Bergsonians use the term ‘unconscious’ (inconscient) in the wrong sense . For the ‘unconscious’ signifies the absence of consciousness. Whereas the Bergsonians conceive of the unconscious as a form of consciousness that continues, as it were, in a hidden manner< l 66).

In addition to distinguishing degrees of consciousness, Bergson also classifies states of consciousness according to their quality (qualité): he divides them into two categories—deep and superficial states. The former are revealed to us through intuition and inner duration. The latter, on the other hand, are recognised through the inquiries of understanding, in the form of ideas and concepts. This division is artificial. For both represent our truly human way of life, in contrast to our animal existence, and man’s purely mental life is

is no less subtly connected, no less personal, no less spontaneous, no less continuous, and no less detached from matter than the former. It, too, is a direct product of consciousness< 1 67>.

Bergson had made a clear distinction, in terms of structure, between the intellect—which, far from providing us with true knowledge of things and entities, merely offers concepts—and intuition. This clear distinction has given rise to many of the objections levelled against his philosophy. Maurice Blondel states that, even in the ‘etymological’ sense, intuition and intellect are one and the same, and that both ‘awaken the idea of a light that penetrates to the very heart of reality’< 1 6!!).

At this point, we are compelled to highlight yet another contradiction in Bergson’s thought (0 6’1). The philosopher, at one point in his work (0 70), states that intuition—

65. Alain: *Les idées et les liens*, vol. 1, p. 46.

66. Alain: *Histoire de mes pensées*, p. 78.

167. B. Baudouin: Essais de psychologie, 14.

68. Maurice Blondel: *Le Processus de l’intelligence*, 249; see also the same author: *La Pensée*, vol. 1, 373.

169. Penido: 123, footnote.

1 70. Ev. cr., 1 49–1 47.

Although he clearly demonstrates that there is not merely a matter of degree but a difference in nature between intuition and intellect, elsewhere (0 7 1 l) he concedes that they complement one another and that it is erroneous to draw a definitive distinction between them. However, despite this latter statement, 'anti-intellectualism'—that is, the denial of intellect—'has very often been the starting point and logical foundation of Bergsonism'< ı nı.

Bergson acknowledges that intuition—which he describes as the knowledge of the absolute—is not sufficient in itself, particularly when it comes to acquiring knowledge of the external world, and must be supplemented by the sciences.

The sciences serve the function of providing an objective foundation for our perceptions. According to him, 'in order not to lose our way, we must acquire points of reference outside ourselves' (p. 173). This statement is regarded by the philosopher as an expression of intuition's impotence as a means of acquiring knowledge of the absolute: 'It cannot, by its very nature, attain knowledge that leads to the absolute on its own' (p. 74). The same author cannot resist adding the following remarks in response to Bergsonism's penchant for the sciences: 'Bergson would almost seek the value of intuition in its ability to reconcile with the sciences' (p. 75).

Having touched upon many of philosophy's issues and, in many points, has not only been able to attract the most advanced ideas of our age to itself, but has also been unable to prevent the scornful glances of many who belittle its value from being directed towards it. To the same extent that those who embrace this system are fiercely devoted to it, we find its opponents to be equally relentless. Among the latter, Alain already attributes only historical value to Bergsonism. According to him, Berg-1 7 1. Ev. cr., 1 93.

172. Penido: 195.

173. Ev. cr., 260.

174. Penido: Ibid., 179.

175. The same work, 180.

The Bergsonians were right to attack a ridiculous mechanism and the intellect as described by Taine, that is all. However, he himself finds the Bergsonians terrifying
: ‘I see them approaching the matter with Catholicism, despotism and war all weighing on their shoulders’ 1 76l.

If one seeks the truth, the value of Bergsonism lies solely in the history of thought It is evident that he was not merely defined by the role he played. Like all great creators, he was the creator of a system in his own right. His greatest strengths in this regard were his sharp critical faculties and his firm convictions. He possessed neither Schelling’s metaphysical imagination nor Descartes’s power of conceptualisation. He did not claim to have created a system or founded a school. He wished to teach a method of doing philosophy.

‘Even in his metaphysical descriptions, he retained a concern for reason and a sense that there is an end to all things. With this detachment, this sense of futility, Bergson is a man of our time; he is one of us.

“Let us not claim to have already gauged the true greatness with which future generations will recognise him. Perhaps, if he does not measure up to the greatest, this is because he is a man of a fragmented humanity, caught within the contradictions of accumulated knowledge,
a humanity torn asunder, in an era when the philosophical quest for synthesis was met with disdain
era in which the philosophical quest for synthesis has been scorned. It should suffice for us to take up the legacy he has bequeathed to thought and, in spite of everything, to continue the eternal quest.” 177.

1 76. Alain: Histoire de mes pensées, 91.

1 77. René Avourd: Réflexions sur la philosophie Berlesmienne, Revue de Paris, 1 94 1.

1 07

CHAPTER III

THE INTUITION OF REALITIES

I. INTUITION IN ART

Following a critical examination of intuition, we shall ascend to the realm of values over which it reigns supreme. In art, in ethics and within the confines of the individual, we shall attain that which intuition can offer us directly.

Bergson has not devoted an entire book, or even a single article, to the understanding of the intuition employed by the artist. However, in his three articles—scattered as hints across certain pages of his books *Creation, Evolution and the Direct Data of Consciousness*—and from a few pages (2) crammed into his book *Laughter* (*Le rire*), which he devoted to explaining the so-called ‘comic’ phenomenon,

, from which we can derive the aesthetics of intuition.

Bergson’s aesthetics served as a complete reaction to Boileau’s aesthetics—which was based on Descartes’ method and idealised abstract expression in the art of poetry—by defending the thesis that ‘what is well understood should be clearly explained’; and this art has
further from us, never to return<3>. In fact, whilst Boileau’s Cartesian aesthetics

was, however, discredited by the Romantics. In *La Pensée et le Mouvant*: the essays ‘Intuition philosophique’, ‘Introduction à la métaphysique’ and ‘La perception du changement’.

2. Le ri re: From page 152 onwards.

3. Tanerede de Yi san: *L’auirude du lyri.mıe cmıtemporain*, 445. l l l

ARTISTIC INSPIRATION

The desire for clear and robust expression, drawing strength from nineteenth-century positivism and embracing the influences of rationalism, had given rise to the Parnassians. Unlike the Romantics, who sought to imbue their ideas with emotion, they intellectualised their emotions. In doing so, they destroyed their own creative elements (41.
Before Bergson, the ‘symbolists’ sought to express living reality by delving deeply into it without rigidifying it, through the movement that constitutes the rhythm of the soul<6>.

Bergson articulated this conception of art. The view of art he presents to us is in no way different from that of Symbolism<6>.

In seeking to understand what Bergson’s aesthetics consists of, let us first examine intuition—the method of this aesthetics—then the world of art, and finally how intuition seeks its own form of expression.

The Method of Art

Bergson states that “alongside normal perception, there is also an aesthetic faculty ’ in human beings. This faculty, known as aesthetic intuition, is the perception of the external and seeks out the individual (individuel) within it (7). This intuition consists of ‘sympathy and instinct’, which draw the artist into the very heart of things<9>. As we know, instinct gives rise to intuition by freeing itself from practical interests, purifying itself and expanding its scope. How does aesthetic intuition come about? What does the procedure of this method consist of? How does one become immersed in the reality of art and achieve a sympathetic union with it?

Aesthetic intuition, which is the perception of the external world as it is, is what binds us to the external world, severing all ties of interest between us and it. 4. The same work, 447.

5. The same work, continued.

6. The same work, 431.

7. Ev. cr., 192.

8. Ev. cr., 192.

9. Ev. cr., 191. B

ERGSON

means to sever. It is our practical interests that veil true reality from our eyes. ‘If reality had struck our senses directly
, if we could come into direct contact both with things and with ourselves, art would be a useless thing, or rather, we would all be artists; for then our spirit would be constantly shaken every time it approached nature”< 1 01. Whereas, when we turn to the external world to recognise it, we find ourselves
, we also find ourselves there. “This view, derived from the entities of the external world and our own self, is a perspective in which our attachment to reality, and our need to live and move, constricts and depletes us. In truth, the more preoccupied we are with living, the less
less inclined to look, and that the constraints of movement narrow our field of vision” o 1 1. The artist, however, by freeing himself entirely from the necessities of movement, comes into contact with things in a disinterested and detached manner. Art
thus becomes “the direct manifestation of reality”< 1 11. And ultimately, aesthetic intuition ensures that we “capture the profound unity that constitutes the character of things, unite with the spirit of the universe, and experience reality in its entirety”0 3J. However, achieving this goal is not possible in an instant. At the outset, what presents itself to the artist is not yet reality,
but rather something ‘vague’ akin to our inclinations: a few coloured patches, a few lines, the guiding idea of a book, the barely discernible form of a problem, or a deep feeling seeking to manifest itself”< J 4J. Whilst this synthesis is still unfolding, the artist cannot foresee in advance what the resulting creation will be like. No matter what sort of sketches he may have made beforehand, that 10. Rir, 152.

11. Pen. mou., 171.

12. Rir, 160.

13. Penido: 127.

14. Ibid., 129–130.

cannot tell us with absolute certainty what fate it will ultimately take. For a true work of art is one that has been lived. And the artist lives his work at every moment.

It is certain that, should the work not be lived, the artist would require

and constantly accumulating knowledge of every kind. For, just as in every field, the existence of a great deal of preparatory knowledge is a prerequisite for intuition in art. Nothing can be created from nothing. 'To invent' means to bring together, in the mind, the vast multitude of elements in the form of a synthetic intuition into a synthetic intuition within the mind.

However, the synthesis transcends the form of the elements that constitute it and acquires an entirely new quality'l l 5l.

By incorporating new visions into his work, the artist constantly alters this composition and reshapes it anew each time. He gives it new forms. This ceaseless activity, which requires a greater or lesser degree of effort, ultimately culminates—beyond the artist's own will—

, culminating in a work that seems to impose itself upon the artist: the work of art, in a state of free creation, as the product of the composition's ceaseless formation, unfolds before our eyes like a ripe fruit that has fallen from the tree.

The reality of art

The difference between the aesthetic intuition Bergson describes to us and what the Germans call 'Einfühlung'—that is, sympathetic symbolism—lies solely in the fact that the latter involves consciousness, through a passionate surge, merging with nature and objects, then incorporating them into the self through a sympathetic union, and thus perceiving the self's passionate presence as dominant throughout the universe. Bergson's intuition, however, is a union that lies at the very centre of things, independent of both. In this union, the external world never loses its own distinctiveness.

This is only possible when the self, for a moment, assumes the characteristics of objects. 5. Edouard Le Roy: Un positivisme nouveau, p. 151.

This is nothing other than an effort to recognise it as it is by taking refuge within it. Nor is this a form of subjectivism; for consciousness, far from imposing its own characteristics upon the object, takes refuge in the object's existence

as it is.

Bergson's aesthetics resembles the concept of 'Einfühlung' only insofar as it involves the sympathetic fusion of consciousness with things.

Where should we seek the reality that makes possible the development, or indeed the very emergence,

? It seems to us that pure duration, which belongs to us, and the qualities (qualité) in things—which are the sole reality that strikes our perceptions—constitute the subject matter of this aesthetics.

Let us first consider duration: according to Bergson, 'no single image can take the place of the intuition of duration. However, many different images, drawn from a wide variety of objects, may, by virtue of the proximity of movements, be captured and, at a certain point where an intuition is present, direct consciousness. By selecting as scattered an array of images as possible, we shall prevent any single one from usurping the place of the intuition to which it is bound , for in that case it would be immediately driven out by its rivals. By ensuring that, despite the differences in their appearances, they all demand the same kind of attention and the same degree of tension from our mind, consciousness will gradually be accustomed to a wholly particular and very specific state, the state it will adopt in order to reveal itself to itself without veil"
< Jtı>.

As the intuition of duration belongs entirely to consciousness, we might say that it is the subjective condition of intuition. In such an intuition, the rhythm of the artist's own inner life gives rise to the compelling element and the musical melody

. Segond states that pure duration gives rise to this melody : “Bergson’s philosophy is that of one who abandons oneself to living and lives one’s own life—1 6. Pen. mou., 2 10–2 1 1.

by placing the sensation of pure duration—which is identical to the feeling of a person who surrenders to life and listens to their own existence—at the centre of the universe, has it not shown to what extent the melody in a musical work inspires us with the very foundation of expression, genius and that which is truly meaningful? These considerations may extend to fields other than music”<l 7l.

The dominance of the artist’s personal time in a work of art—and consequently, what must be sought in a poem or a painting—should be “not the entities shaped by the work, nor objective and impersonal subjects, but rather solely the artist’s personality as revealed in the work”.

The objective condition of intuition, however, consists of pure qualities (qualité pure) gathered within the intuition of time as pure perceptions, once we have completely detached ourselves from practical concerns regarding our interests. Among these qualities (qualités), which are intended to be imbued in intuition to the greatest possible extent
, there is a difference of nature, not merely a difference of degree, even after they have been transformed into pure perceptions.
Segond divides the world of these qualities (qualité) that constitute nature in the artist’s eyes into three stages: in the first stage, aesthetic life reveals a sort of ‘mathematics of qualities’. The nature he organises through his stylistic games bears a multitude of resemblances that give concrete form to his own intention. In the second stage, however, the qualities brought to life in the work give rise to physics. In this state, it gathers within itself a multitude of vague impressions.

Finally, in the third level, aesthetic life brings to life the history of pure quality within the work it produces. The art that has been naturalised and the nature that has been artified, whose forms it has transformed, reveal their reciprocal and intimate relationship 09l.

The fusion of qualities, which is constantly increasing, leads the consciousness to where? 17. J. Segond: L’esthétique du sentiment, 52.

18. Ibid., 123.

19. J. Segond: *L’imagination*, p. 149.

BERGSON

? Bergson states that intuition must seek out the concrete and the individual. The general is what our everyday perceptions
. There is nothing in it that concerns us. Intuition and style

How is the artist to express what aesthetic intuition directly imparts to him? For in art there is also a necessity of expression. How must intuition be expressed so that it may be conveyed to the consciousness of others in the same state, without the nature of the intuition being distorted? We have at our disposal a most perilous instrument. For language cannot grasp intuition without fixing its movement in a particular place or adapting it to a colloquial form. Yet, within pure duration, the self, flowing in a manner reminiscent of the flow of life, is unique. That concrete self is no longer an ‘object’. It is a
process (progress). Language itself can only

state. Yet states of mind are entirely new the moment they arise, and intuition confronts us with such a brand-new reality

. How can we describe its concrete and uniquely individual state without distorting it in any way, without altering its very nature?

Undoubtedly, an image does not reflect intuition. To convey it from the artist’s consciousness to other minds, one must call upon the aid of many images. ‘It is necessary to bring together many images in order to alter the nature of the fundamental emotion as little as possible and to express it in its original freshness’<10>.

It is through the skilful combination of numerous and diverse visions—
, aesthetic intuition finds its own expression and is born in a real sense within the world of art. Thus, in art, there is a process whereby the artist perceives ideas entirely unrelated to his own life and develops these into intuition within his own consciousness. 20. Tanerede de Yisan: The aforementioned work, 457.

the realm of intuition; the other, however, consists of the use of means to convey the intuitions he has experienced to other forms without altering their nature—the realm of discourse (discours)—and these two must be strictly distinguished from one another. Just as not every person who possesses intuition can be an artist, neither are skills of expression alone sufficient to make a person a true artist. Whilst intuition prompts the artist, through sufficient intellect, to seek the expression it desires, intuition and expression are distinct from one another. Setting aside their intuition, the artist prepares a form that is perfectly suited to the subtleties of their inner melody—that is, their intuition—by organising the multitude and complexity of images that best reflect the perceived reality, the order of sound and expression, and the mysterious encounters of words and even letters as they appear side by side; and they make that form available to all consciousnesses
can utilise

. Then it is as though they fill this mould with the substance of their intuition. This is the excitement that permeates us, arising almost empirically—that is, spontaneously as a result of a chance encounter with the artist's intuitions.
It is not a mere coincidence. Artistic excitement is inevitably created by the style that the artist, using every kind of technical and expressive means, has organised within a shared intellectual framework between himself and us. It is not a chance occurrence, and for that very reason it is self-assured. One might fear that the verses of a poet imbued with such powerful intuitions might fail to evoke aesthetic excitement in any of us. Yet Mehmed Akif's,

'What place remains for me in this world, rest assured, nor a beloved; seek another ground, another land to wander.'

or Yahya Kemal's,

‘Walk on, free, to the very limit where the blue

ends.’ ‘A person lives as long as they dream in this

world.’

there is never any fear that these lines will fail to evoke aesthetic excitement. The work bears the mark of self-assurance upon itself 1 1 8

BERGSON

. The intuition that has attained the most perfect expression for itself is fully confident in itself. For it cannot be claimed that our intuitions, when left unexpressed in art, fully acquire artistic value. The artist’s intuition is completed through its expression.

Otherwise, as Bergson says, we cannot all become artists simply by ‘coming into direct contact with nature through objects’. The means of expression play a role in , as demonstrated by the efforts of Symbolists such as Cézanne, Van Gogh and Picasso to fill their expressions with various elements, as if they were dissecting nature .

1 1 9

II. THE ETHICS OF INTUITION

Bergson set out his ethics last. It was expected that he would apply his method of intuition to ethics. It seemed natural to many that, just as an aesthetic intuition had been articulated, so too should a moral intuition.
Among Bergsonists, some who had applied this method to ethics before him (2 1 > mystical

, whilst others!22> turned to amoralism. However, in 1932, by publishing *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Bergson put an end to the curious speculations that had been preoccupying everyone’s minds regarding the kind of ethical system he would construct
. Whilst the emphasis placed on mysticism in the work demonstrated the accuracy of Jacques Chevalier’s views and bolstered the pride of mystics, it did not have the same effect on purely intuitive spiritualists. They were awaiting an explanation of a form of intuition capable of deriving a system of moral values from Bergson and of standing on its own

. Yet the philosopher used intuition in this work only once, and that was in the interpretation of the mystical experience. The work was, essentially, a sort of reconciliation between a biological phenomenon and sociological experiments. In this way, Bergson produced an ethics
.

Bergson distinguishes between two types of ethics: ‘closed ethics’ (morale close) and ‘open ethics’ (morale ouverte). According to him, the individual is a social being 2 1. Jacques Chevalier.

22. Jean Weber.

1 20

BERGSON

and is subject to its pressure. Bergson confines himself to acknowledging this social discipline and establishing that this pressure is a fact, without investigating whether it is right or wrong. This is the lower morality, the morality of society. To rise to true morality, the individual
must break free from submission to society; they must rise to morality through an inner impulse. Higher morality is human morality. The former is enclosed within the boundaries of society; it is closed. The latter, however, is entirely open; it has no boundaries. The good father and the good citizen are people of the closed morality. There is not merely a matter of degree between these two forms of morality, but a difference in nature; it is impossible to pass from one to the other. Will a man who loves his own family, the people of his city, and the nation to which he belongs reach the love of humanity as he expands these circles one by one? No. There is no continuity between these two forms of morality. He who loves his own family has set this love against the love for other families; he who loves his own nation has set this love against the love for other nations. The flip side of their love bears the expression of hatred and enmity. For love to emerge from enmity, however, is an impossibility. The ethics of humanity are based on a universal love that harbours no hatred towards anyone. Some souls are able to rise above all groups and experience this love.

There is a fundamental difference between closed morality and open morality:

Closed morality is collective in nature. Society imposes the rules of this morality on all members of the group, on the whole. Perhaps individual souls reflect on these rules as they accept them. However, this plays no significant role in the spread of morality. Many object to Bergson's idea. Indeed, it would be incorrect to say that even moderately complex societies possess only a single morality. In advanced societies, there are many moral systems that clash with one another. Therefore, one cannot speak of 'a single morality'. The numerous
are not merely moral theories; the multitude and discord

within moral trends are also a plain fact. Moreover, this

situation cannot be regarded as a characteristic of our

time. The discord observed in Rome and Greece was not

confined to philosophical theories alone.

is also a prominent phenomenon. Moreover, this situation is not unique to our times. The disagreements observed in Rome and Greece were not confined to philosophical theories; there were also conflicting practical moral codes in those societies. The individual could choose any of the moral codes offered to them and

thereby imprinting their own personal stamp on that choice.

Let us turn to public morality. This is the ethics of humanity. We find examples of this ethics in the sages of antiquity and the saints produced by the religions. Which path must an individual follow to become a sage or a saint? According to some, knowledge is paramount. Others, however, hold love above all else. Bergson examined the issue from the perspective of individual conscience.

Heroes and saints are among us. Our task is to study them and adopt their virtues.

The outline of this ideal was to be found in the theory of sympathy in *Creative Evolution*. The moral intuition that the human soul derives from other souls arises through sympathy.

Bergson's ethics must not be separated from the entirety of his system. As in his other works, we see here too a collection of several antitheses. Just as open ethics is set against closed ethics, and the religion of salvation is set against the religion of the state, so too is intuition set against the intellect, which is the natural cradle of egoism<23).

On the other hand, the idea of the ‘life impulse’—one of the fundamental tenets of Bergsonism—is also evident here. Bergson accepts that, in terms of its essence, every ethics is biological<24>. Just as the foundation and starting point of ethics is biological, so too does the development of morality occur through the impulse, and this impulse culminates in the movements of the great mystics that unite humanity with God.

It can by no means be claimed that it is based entirely on an intuitive foundation—23. Mor. re/. , ı 29.

24. Mm: re/., p. 103.

1 22

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BERGSON

Many further criticisms could be levelled at Bergson’s ethics, in addition to what we have said above.

Above all, the notion of attaining divine love by proceeding from a biological basis is not something that is easily understood.

Furthermore, the ideal of a ‘open society’—that is, the ideal of humanity—in which open morality is practised, does not, in and of itself, lead to a moral end. There are open-minded individuals who live within a closed society and cherish its ideal. Indeed, not all humanists have been moral.

Finally, Bergson has not presented an intuitive perspective on the many values that humanity upholds in the moral realm. Nor has he indicated a principle that would enable us to derive a judgement or a rule of conduct regarding each of these. The mere idea of love is not sufficient to

.

The greatest shortcoming in Bergson’s work is that he did not undertake a psychological and profound critique of our actions. A thinker whose approach to philosophy began with psychology should have based his ethics on a psychological system of values

. To this end, he would first and foremost have had to present a critique of human actions.

Bergson lived alongside the people of the 20th century, who had witnessed the horrors of two world wars and whose beliefs had been
shaken. In him, rather than any passion for religion, ethics or any other ideal of humanity, what prevails is a strong delight in inquiry, which spreads like a light piercing the darkness of his intellect. Although it brings together the two sources of ethics and religion, along with certain value judgements
, is the product of the intellect rather than of intuition. Finally, the fact that in this work we do not find the method of psychological analysis used by the philosopher in his first work, *The Direct Data of Consciousness*, but instead encounter superficial arguments and subjective judgements, is the main cause and source of our dissatisfaction . In a word, the philosopher began his system with deep psychology and concluded it with sociological explanations.

1 23

III. INTUITION AND RELIGION

Bergson has also divided religions into two categories: static and dynamic. Static religion is the religion of the city, the religion of society; it is a closed religion. Dynamic religion, on the other hand, is the religion of humanity; it is an open religion. Christianity and Islam are dynamic religions. True mysticism has manifested itself in dynamic religions.

Static religion, the religion of the people, emerged in the earliest human societies and is still practised today. ‘Just as in the past, even today there are human societies that possess neither science, nor art, nor philosophy. Yet a society without religion has never been seen’<25>.

Two things characterise human nature: intelligence and the ability to live in society<26>. Intelligence is surrounded by a bundle of instincts<27>. Instinct give rise to intuition in humans. The first religion will emerge from this vague intuition. Social life drives humans to make sacrifices for the community. “When, like the ant and the bee,
, when left to its instincts, will be directed solely

the goal it is directed towards; it will work for the species automatically, as if stirring in its sleep. When endowed with intelligence and awakened to thought, it will turn in on itself and think of nothing but a life of pleasure. Undoubtedly, a rational

will prove to him that living by working for the happiness of others is beneficial for himself—25. Mor. rel., 1 05 .

26. Mor. rel., 121.

27. Mor. rel., 123.

"<heat. Intellect will first advocate egoism<29l. The vague intuition that overcomes

, counters this movement of intellect. Through instinct—the very seed of intuition—man alters the direction of the movement set in motion by intellect. This reaction, this resistance, gave rise to the first religion. In this respect, religion is “nature’s protective reaction
’<30l. The primary function of religion is the protection of society.

Its other function is, consequently, also to protect society.

Human beings also know that they will die, that they are condemned to death. The very notion of death, however, weighs heavily on the human drive for life. Faced with the thought that death cannot be eliminated
, man counters this with the fantasy that life will continue after death. The fantasies and intellectual games that characterised the earliest religions arose from the need to resist death. According to this second view, religion is ‘a protective reaction of nature against the helplessness of death as perceived by the intellect’<31l.

An older theory<32> sought the origin of religion in the
. “Undoubtedly, the awe felt by man in the face of nature plays a part in the birth of religion. However, religion is not fear; it is a reaction to fear”<33>. Another theory<34> sought the source of religion in the belief in spirits. “The history of religions had long accepted, as an explanation for all of them, that the belief in spirits gave rise to primitive religion”<35>. The transition from the belief in spirits to the concept of God did not occur suddenly. “Although the transition from belief in spirits to gods was imperceptible, the relationship between spirits and gods—28. Mor. rel., p. 26.

29. Mor. re[., p. 27.

30. Mor. re[., p. 27.

31. Mor. rel., 137.

32. Naturalism.

33. Mor. rel., 161.

34. Animism (Spiritualism).

35. Mor. re[., p. 86.

1 25

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTUITION AND RELIGION

The difference between these concepts is striking. God is a person.

He has virtues, flaws and a character. He is a name in

. He maintains certain relationships with other gods. He has important duties and only He can carry out these tasks. On the contrary, there are thousands of different spirits scattered throughout a country, all performing the same task and known by the same name" (36l.
Gods are added to the spirits; they do not take their place. 'Worship of spirits will always be tied to the principle of worshipping spirits, whilst the enlightened among the peoples will prefer the gods; it may be said that the transition to polytheism has been a step towards civilisation.'

In the religion of society, the individual's capacity for storytelling has joined hands with the power of society that safeguards individual beliefs (38). "Indeed, the function of religion is the preservation of social life. However, for this reason, there is a necessary connection between religion and morality
should not be assumed

. The opposite has also occurred in history. Blasphemy has always been considered a sin. Yet immorality or murder has not always been regarded as blasphemy... Undoubtedly, humanity has often wished for its gods to be good. However, people have not demanded proof

"l3<J>. Historically, the evolution of religion and morality has taken place along separate paths(4n>.

As for the dynamic religion, we know that it is the religion of all humanity. Bergson called it the ‘open religion’. ‘The static religion binds the individual to society by telling tales,
to children in their cradles, by telling them fairy tales, binds the individual to society” (411.

In Lausanne, the evolution of the life impulse follows only the path opened by the intellect 36. Mor. re/. , 199.

37. Mor. re/., 199.

38. Mor. re/., 211–212.

39. Mor. re/., 219.

40. Mor. re/., 219.

4 I. Mor. re/., 225.

1 26

BERGSON

does not satisfy him. When one considers the fate of humankind, the intellect can merely present possibilities; it does not lead to a specific reality. Yet we know that a bundle of love, arising from the evolution of instinct,
completely. The soul that can transform this intuition into movement within itself ‘feels that an existence transcending its own, like the fire that reddens the iron, permeates it without annihilating its own personality. Thereafter, its attachment to life stems from this principle,
It becomes a state of inseparability. This principle is joy within joy; it is the love of that which is itself love"<42J. From then on, the individual devotes themselves to the whole of humanity and loves humanity within the love that is their own principle. In them, even the form of assurance that static religion provides to the individual has

: there is no longer any anxiety about the future, nor any return to suffering within oneself... The process of moving beyond individual beings to
<43>. This is mystical religion.

Dynamic religion is based on the principle of mysticism. ‘Mysticism is a rare gem’<44>. ‘True mysticism is an exceptional state’<45>.

The new, dynamic religion, which encompasses all of humanity, “will give a new direction to the old; it will bring about a more or less definite shift towards the god of the early ages—who has moved beyond the task of creating myths—and who, by revealing himself in his purpose, illuminates and warms the privileged souls with his very being”<46>. What is the source and purpose of this impulse that characterises the dynamic new religion? ‘The effort manifested by life, even if it is not God Himself, comes from God.

The great mystic is an individual who transcends the boundaries imposed by the material structure and thereby perpetuates the divine movement”<47J.

42. Mor. ret., 226.

43. M01: rel., 226–227.

44. M01: rel., 227.

45. Mor. ret., 228.

46. Mor. rel., 229.

47. Mor. rel., 235.

INTUITION AND RELIGION

“Plotinus had been permitted to behold the promised land; Hikin was not allowed to follow in his footsteps
. He ascended to that state of ecstasy in which he believed and felt that the soul, illuminated by the lights of God, stood face to face with God; yet he must not cross this final threshold—which leads to the stage where contemplation is dissolved in motion and merges with the divine
will; he believed he had reached the summit: to go any further would be a descent. He expressed this in a magnificent way: ‘Movement is the weakened state of contemplation’<48).

Buddhism, which strips itself bare of human life yet fails to attain divine life

and thus caught in the dizzying void between these two states, is a mystical religion. Yet his is not true mysticism. For true mysticism is movement, creativity and love<49>.

'Whether due to the inadequacy of the endeavour, or because material conditions or a narrow intellect stood in its way, there was no complete mysticism either in Greece or in India'<so1. The mysticism observed in India, Greece and among the Plotinists gives rise to states of ecstasy (extase) and contemplation. There is no action in them. "True mysticism is found in the great Christian mystics"<s n. Christian mysticism has reached the level of action (action). For this reason, it is far superior to its predecessors; with a new
leap has taken it beyond them. "Consider what a Saint Paul, a Sainte Thérèse, a Sainte Catherine of Siena, a Saint Francis, or a Jeanne d'Arc have achieved in the realm of action. All these fruitful actions,
were utilised in the spread

."<p.

48. Mor. re/., 236.

49. Mor. re/. , 241.

50. Mor. re/, 242.

51. Mor. re/, 243.

52. Mor. re/., 243.

BERGSON

Bergson describes the true mysticism that is complete and has attained its goal in Christianity, and all the stages of the movement within the souls of the great mystics, in
in the table we have reproduced here through very subtle and careful analyses:

‘The soul, shaken to its depths by the current that carries it along, is freed for a moment from the law whereby the species and the individual condition one another in a cyclical manner, and ceases to turn in on itself. It stands as if listening to a voice
. Then it is propelled straight forward. It is not directly aware of the force that stirs it; it feels the indescribable peace of Hikin, or discovers it through a symbolic vision. At that

is when a boundless joy, an ecstasy that absorbs his very being, a state of bliss that transports him, comes over him: God is present there, and the soul is with Him.
There are no more secrets. Problems vanish, darkness dissipates; this is a state of inner enlightenment. But how long will it last? An imperceptible, causeless anxiety, hovering over the state of ecstasy, descends upon it and clings to it like a shadow. This causeless anxiety, even if subsequent states do not arise, will suffice to distinguish true and complete mysticism from its
imitation or a state of preparation. This causeless unease demonstrates that the great mystical spirit does not remain stationary in a state of ecstasy, as if having reached the end of a journey. You might say, ‘Surely this is a period of rest’; yet this rest is like the respite of a train carriage, shaken under pressure by the locomotive, which continues to move in constant tremors whilst awaiting the next push forward at a station.

To put it more plainly: union with Allah, however narrow it may be, will only become absolute when it is ‘ ’. Undoubtedly, there remains no distance
. For the matters that constitute the measure of the distance between them—and indeed, that which brings it into being—have vanished. There remains no separation between the lover and the Beloved: Allah is there 1 29

and joy are infinite. Yet even if the soul dissolves into the divine being as thought and emotion, one aspect of it remains outside; this is the will: should it act, that action remains bound solely to itself. Its life is not yet complete. It is vaguely aware of this and is
anxious about it. This stirring in the moment of repose is characteristic of the state we call full mysticism: it expresses that the impetus to go further has been attained, and that it is concerned with the faculty of vision and the stirring of the senses; yet it also indicates that the will exists and that it must

. When this feeling grows to the point of encompassing everything, the state of ecstasy fades, the soul is left alone and sometimes becomes troubled. Having become accustomed to the dazzling light for a time, it can no longer make out anything in the darkness. It is vaguely
taking place within it. It feels it has lost much; yet it does not yet realise that it is on the verge of gaining everything. This is the ‘dark night’ of which the great mystics speak—perhaps the most significant, and certainly the most instructive, aspect of Christian mysticism. It is a preparation for the ‘kat’l
purity. It is impossible to analyse this preparation for the goal; even the mystics themselves can scarcely discern its mechanism.
Let us simply say that a steel machine of extraordinary resilience, built for the purpose of performing an exceptionally arduous task, would find itself in a similar state had it possessed self-awareness whilst its parts were being assembled. The parts of this machine, subjected one by one to the most gruelling tests, with some parts flying out of their places to be replaced by new ones,
it would have felt a sense of deficiency here and there and a sense of pain all around. Yet this agony, felt entirely from the outside, will deepen only to vanish shortly thereafter in the anticipation and hope of becoming a perfect instrument. The mystical spirit desires to become this instrument. To be suitable for divine use within its own essence—1 30

BERGSON

it discards everything that is not entirely pure, fully resilient and incapable of being bent. It was only now that it was beginning to sense anew the existence of God

; it had only just begun to perceive Him through symbolic visions

He believed in it; indeed, just a moment ago he had been united with Allah in a state of ecstasy; yet none of this was permanent, for it all amounted to mere contemplation

: the movement carried the soul towards itself and thus separated it from God. Now, however, God acts through him and within him
. The union becomes complete and absolute. In this state, terms such as ‘mechanism’ and ‘instrument’ give rise to illusions that must be cast aside. It is possible to make use of them to give an idea of the preparatory work. However, they teach us nothing
. Let us say, then, that a life of abundance has begun for the soul. This is a vast leap. It is an unstoppable impulse that drives the soul towards the broadest of trials

impetus that leads the soul to the broadest of trials. A serene exuberance in all the soul's movements ensures that the soul possesses a grand vision and, however weak it may be, realises it with power.

It sees, in particular, through simplicity, and in the same way,
behaviour, guides it amidst the chaotic states of which it seems scarcely even aware. An innate knowledge—or rather, an acquired clarity—thus instils in it, at the first opportunity, a purposeful course, a resolute movement, and unquestionable words. Nevertheless, there remains a necessity to exert effort, to be patient and to remain steadfast. Yet these come naturally to the spirit—which is both the mover and the moved, and which unites its freedom with divine movement—and spread out from it.
These indicate that a great deal of energy is expended; yet this energy,
has been both acquired and bestowed, for the overflowing abundance of life it manifests

flows once more from the very source of life. Now, the perspectives have diverged. Divinity, now having become filled to the brim with itself—ru-1 3 1

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is no longer visible from the outside. There remains nothing that essentially distinguishes the person who has reached this state from the other people amongst whom they move. Only they are aware of the transformation that elevates them within themselves—a transformation that is receptive to Allah's influence and active in influencing others

is of which only he is aware. He takes no pride in this elevation. On the contrary, his humility is great. In the silent, solitary conversations he holds, amidst the excitement of feeling his entire soul melt away, having beheld what might be called divine humility, how could he not be humble?"<53l.

Whilst still in this phase of mystical ecstasy and contemplation, the outline of the movement began to take shape. "No sooner had it descended from the heavens to the earth than the need to
. The undertaking was daunting: the faith gained through personal experience could not be conveyed to the world in words. Is it even possible to describe that which defies expression? Yet this matter never gave the great mystics pause.

Like a stirring force, the great mystic felt the truth coursing through his very veins. Just as the sun has no need to spread its own light, so too could his spontaneous outpouring not be restrained. It did not spread through ordinary words and expressions. For the love that gave it birth is not merely one man's love for God, but the love that God holds for all humanity. 'Through Allah and by Allah, He loves all humanity with a divine love'<54l.

The aim of mysticism is to create unity in the cosmos (unite cosmique) through love. However, it is only through mystical communion that the human will, united with God,

is capable of creating universal love amongst people. Yet this universal love amongst people cannot be attained merely by expanding the community and opening its heart. Only by becoming one with the impulse of life can the mystic "love all humanity" 53. Mor. re/., 245–249.

54. Mor. re/. , 249.

indivisible single love'<55). As this love—which the mystic desires to be consumed in God—gradually radiates its light, humanity will become divine. The great mystics wish to transform humanity—this creature, which is merely a member of the species—into a creative endeavour; they wish to turn humanity, which constitutes a step and a stage in creative evolution, into a movement. Will they succeed in this?

The greatest obstacle is the impossibility of creating a divine humanity. For man, too, is merely an animal amongst other animals.

The mystics are attempting to replace this human existence with a divine one, transforming it piece by piece and little by little<56l. To achieve this goal, the privileged souls undertaking this mystical endeavour form a spiritual community, and each of these communities spreads throughout the world by giving rise to new ones<57l. "The great mystics set about fundamentally transforming humanity

by setting themselves as examples”<58l. At the head of the mystics we see Jesus. “All the great mystics have imitated, originally but imperfectly, exactly what Jesus did, and have continued his work”<59l.

‘Jesus himself is nothing other than a continuation of the prophets of Israel’<60l. ‘All mystics acknowledge that, just as we need God, God also needs us. God needs us in order to love us. The philosophy rooted in the mystical experience arrives at this conclusion. According to it, creation is the work of God, who creates creators and unites with beings worthy of His love”<6tl.

55. Mor. re/., 250.

56. Mor. re/., 251.

57. Mor. re/., 252.

58. Mor. re/., 256.

59. Mor. rel., 256.

60. Mor. rel., 256.

61. Mor. rel., 273.

INTUITION AND RELIGION

The mystical experience is the most powerful manifestation of intuition, and ‘the deepening of philosophical intuition, which relies on a firm foundation, is made possible through mystical intuition’ (62l.
There is a group of people on earth who, like others, are mortal. ‘They seem to be the very reason for the existence of other human beings. Through their individual efforts, added to the general
effort, they succeed in breaking the resistance posed by matter, renewing their own material existence and, ultimately, finding God. These are the mystics. They have opened a path upon which other people may walk. Through these actions, they have shown the philosopher where life comes from and where it is going’ (63l.

Mysticism, which liberates the individual spirit from the narrow confines of society and leads it to the whole of humanity, thereby serving as the source of human morality, lies at the very pinnacle of the realms attainable through the experiences of the human spirit. Mysticism, known in Islam as ‘tasawwuf’ and constituting the essence and fundamental structure of Islam, is, according to Bergson, capable of
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